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Abstract
When Roger Needham and Michael Schroeder first introduced a seemingly secure
protocol [24], it took over 18 years to discover that even with the most secure encryption,
the conversations using this protocol were still subject to penetration. To date, there is
still no one protocol that is accepted for universal use. Because of this, analysis of the
protocol outside the encryption is becoming more important. Recent work by Joshua
Guttman and others [9] have identified several properties that good protocols often
exhibit. Termed “Authentication Tests”, these properties have been very useful in
examining protocols. The purpose of this research is to automate these tests and thus
help expedite the analysis of both existing and future protocols.
The success of this research is shown through rapid analysis of numerous protocols for
the existence of authentication tests. The result of this is that an analyst is now able to
ascertain in near real-time whether or not a proposed protocol is of a sound design or
whether an existing protocol may contain previously unknown weaknesses. The other
achievement of this research is the generality of the input process involved. Although
there exist other protocol analyzers, their use is limited primarily due to their complexity
of use. With the tool generated here, an analyst needs only to enter their protocol into a
standard text file; and almost immediately, the analyzer determines the existence of the
authentication tests.

xi

AUTOMATING SECURITY PROTOCOL ANALYSIS

I. Introduction
1.1 Background
When Roger Needham and Michael Schroeder first introduced a seemingly secure
protocol [24], it took over 18 years to discover that even with the most secure encryption,
the conversations using this protocol were still subject to penetration [9]. To date, there is
still no one protocol that is accepted for universal use. Because of this, analysis of the
protocol outside the encryption is becoming more important. Recent work by Joshua
Guttman and others [5] has identified several properties that good protocols often exhibit.
Termed “Authentication Tests”, these properties have been very useful in examining
protocols. The purpose of this research is to automate these tests and thus help expedite
the analysis of both existing and future protocols.
1.2 Problem Statement
Numerous security protocols have been proposed [29]. They utilize both
asymmetric and symmetric cryptography and employ characteristics such as trusted and
non-trusted third parties. Chapter 2 covers these concepts in great detail. The problem is
that analysis of these protocols is normally done either through tedious pen and paper
proofs or by realizing weaknesses after the fact. This research is intended to reduce the
burdensome task of evaluating protocols from a theoretical pen-and-paper method to a
more automated method that incorporates techniques understood to prove certain
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correctness properties of a protocol. Although there are other methods to evaluate
protocols, this research focuses on the methods developed by Guttman et al [5].
1.3 Summary of Results
The Security Protocol Analyzer (SPA) successfully shows that automated tools can be
highly valuable in the performance of protocol analysis. In particular, the SPA is able to
determine when and where outgoing, incoming and unsolicited tests occur within a
protocol run. Using string comparisons vice type comparisons requires specific values be
given and does limit the application to analysis based on completed static runs. However,
putting together numerous protocols in generic text files proves much easier than
individual protocol development as noted in other protocol analyzers [11, 27]. It also
allows for much quicker analysis of the protocol because it does not have to dynamically
create a search tree; instead it only examines the post-run state of the protocol as entered
in the input text file. The SPA takes any protocol as input in a standard text file and
generates accurate output that shows occurrences of authentication tests. Detecting
authentication tests is done in very short time.
1.4 Thesis Overview
The remainder of this thesis consists of four chapters.
•

Chapter 2 – This chapter is intended to give the reader an understanding of the
theoretical aspects of what this thesis intends to accomplish. This chapter focuses
primarily on background literature and other work done in the field of protocol
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analysis. It introduces concepts such as authentication tests, test components and
different types of encryption methods.
•

Chapter 3 – This chapter lays out how the protocol analysis is accomplished. It
describes the inner workings of an automated analysis tool developed specifically
for this research and gives the reader an understanding of how the results of the
protocol analysis tool are to be interpreted.

•

Chapter 4 – In this chapter, numerous protocols are executed using the analysis
tool. The output is described and the importance of certain functionality, in
relation to the tool, is laid out for the reader.

•

Chapter 5 –This is the summary chapter. Here, the determination about the
effectiveness of the tool is given. It also lays out the groundwork as to where
future work in the field of protocol analysis should go.

3

II. Literature Review
2.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter’s purpose is to give the reader a basic understanding of strand spaces and
authentication tests. First, an introduction into the basic forms of encryption, symmetric
and asymmetric, is given. This is necessary to ensure the reader understands basic
cryptographic principles that are discussed throughout this chapter. Next, a brief
introduction of what strand spaces are and how they are a means of representing
protocols within the context of graph theory is given. Particularly, this chapter shows
how strand spaces are used to model current protocols, such as Needham-SchroederLowe [9] and Kerberos [13]. It also introduces the various authentication tests, which are
derived from the theory of strand spaces. Authentication tests are a means of ensuring a
protocol is designed well enough to withstand common capabilities of penetrators, such
as those represented in the Dolev-Yao threat model [26].
Next, this chapter gives a brief introduction into automated modeling tools that
represent potential candidates for automating the tests. The purpose of automating strand
space analysis is to show whether or not potential weaknesses exist within a given
protocol. If successful, this approach can provide a method for alleviating the tedium and
inaccuracy associated with pen-and-paper proofs. Finally, related work in the field of
strand space automation is discussed and their general results summarized.

4

2.2 Symmetric/Asymmetric Cryptography
A brief review of symmetric/asymmetric cryptography is warranted since there is
frequent mention of ‘keys’ belonging to different parties throughout the remainder of this
thesis.
Symmetric Cryptography
With the advent of the Caesar cipher over 3000 years ago, symmetric cryptography
was established as the first form of encryption. It is the use of a single key to perform
both encryption and decryption of messages. The concept works as follows:
If Bob wants to send Alice a message, they have an agreed-upon key, which they will
use for encryption/decryption purposes. This key is most likely a mathematically
generated prime number, which when applied to an algorithm will generate cipher text
(the encrypted message). Alice or Bob can then take the cipher text, along with the same
key, plug it into the same algorithm and generate the original plain text (the unencrypted
message). Symmetric cryptography has the advantage of requiring only one key for both
encryption and decryption, but if compromised, all messages encrypted with that one key
are now in danger of being read by unintended parties!
Asymmetric Cryptography
Asymmetric encryption utilizes two keys, a private and public key to encrypt/decrypt
a message. The public key is the receiver’s key that is freely made available to all
potential senders. The private key is the key owned by the receiver that is never shown to
anyone else. In this case, Alice has a private key, which only Alice knows, and Alice has
a public key, which is available to anyone. Similarly, users will entrust their public key
5

to Alice and keep their private key to themselves. Because Alice has another user’s
public key, Alice can encrypt a message with that public key. Once the message is sent,
only the owner of the corresponding private key can decrypt it. Asymmetric
cryptography has the advantage of guaranteeing that only the intended recipient of a
message can read that message, and does not require sharing private keys with anyone.
(This assumes one’s private key is not compromised.) However, asymmetric keys are
normally mathematically larger than symmetric keys so it is quite common for
asymmetric cryptography simply to be used to encrypt symmetric keys that are
distributed to intended recipients. Another more recent use for asymmetric keys is digital
signing. By encrypting only a portion of the message (e.g. hash of the message) with my
private key, then enclosing the total message in a symmetric key, I guarantee nonrepudiation of its origin. This means that whoever opens the message is assured of its
origin if the sender’s private key is not compromised because at this point, only the
sender’s public key opens the inner encrypted portion.
2.3 Strand Spaces and Security Protocols
A strand space is a graph-theoretic representation of a security protocol. A security
protocol is the handshaking that occurs between different parties, within the context of
computer networks. The intent of the handshaking is to ensure authenticity of each party
to the others, that authorized persons only view a message’s content, and possibly to
generate and/or distribute session keys. Session keys are used temporarily for encryption
during time-sensitive conversations. Their advantage is that they expire; and if they are
not compromised, intercepting a message from one session is not mathematically
6

equivalent to a message from another session regardless of the contents in the message.
Their disadvantage is that they need to be generated for each new session. So, if there is
a weakness in the protocol, a penetrator might be able to ascertain how session keys are
being created. This very flaw is exploited in Needham-Schroeder [9].
Authentication tests stem from an understanding of strand spaces. Therefore, the first
topic covered is strand spaces. Once it is shown how graphs are used to represent
protocols, the next logical step is to show how messages are formed and represented
along these graphs. This is where the concept of a test component is introduced. Then it
is explained how outgoing, incoming and unsolicited tests are derived from test
components and thus result in the formulation of the authentication tests.
2.3.1 Strand Spaces – Brief Overview
To start, let’s assume for now that a protocol only consists of two parties
communicating with each other. Communication consists of a series of discrete events.
For example, Party A sends some sort of message to Party B. Party B receives that
message and maybe sends another back, etc. This process continues for whatever length
of time that given protocol requires. A strand is the sequence of events that occur
involving only one of the parties (A’s strand for this protocol: A sends a message, A
receives a message, A sends another message etc). A regular strand is identified as a
legitimate party’s strand. A strand space, shown as ∑, is the collection of all strands, or
sequences of events, that can occur between communicating parties. It is these ‘strand
spaces’ which form the basis of authentication tests [2]. The authentication tests are a
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means of verifying whether a given protocol can successfully ensure proper (intended)
and secure communication between the parties.
Messages that can be exchanged between communicating parties in a protocol are
called terms. Terms are elements of the set of messages, called A, which can be sent
between communicating parties. The set A is freely generated from two disjoint sets: T,
which represents text (nonces, names etc) and K, which represents keys. The generation
of A from these sets occurs through encryption, concatenation or both. We show
transmitted terms as being preceded by a positive (+) sign and received terms as being
preceded by a negative (-) sign. To further illustrate this, we’ll use t to represent a term
being sent then received by party A from our example above. In the above case, we
represent A sending the term as: + t and A receiving the term as: - t. Also, a term t is said
to be a subterm of t’, written as t ⊂ t’, if one can arrive at t’ by “repeatedly concatenating
[t] with arbitrary terms and encrypting with arbitrary keys.” [8] Encryption of a term is
written as: { t }Ka . If we want to show encryption from the use of a particular party’s
key, we write this as: { t }Ka meaning the term is encrypted with A’s public key. A’s
private key is denoted Ka-1. To represent symmetric cryptography, encryption with a key
shared by A and B is shown as { t }Kab.
Strand spaces are based on graph theory (Figure 2.1). A graph consists of edges and
vertices. The vertices represent communication events, also called nodes. If s is a strand,
then we represent the ith node along that strand as n = <s, i>. There are two kinds of
edges: successive events (nodes) within a strand (shown with the double arrow: ⇒) and
communication between nodes on two separate strands (shown with the single arrow:
8

→). The graph will be acyclic since events cannot go back and precede events that have
already occurred. The relation between nodes on the same strand is represented as n ⇒+
n’ where n = <s, i>, n’ = <s, j> and j > i. The relationship between inter-communicating
nodes, meaning nodes from separate strands, is denoted as n → n’ where term(n) = +t and
term(n’) = -t. Finally, a bundle is defined as a section of the strand space that is large
enough to represent a full protocol exchange. Figure 2.1 demonstrates an example of a
bundle, although in this case, the bundle consists of essentially the protocol itself.

A {Na, A}Kb
B
• ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯→ •
⇓
{Na, Nb}Ka
⇓
• ←⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ •
⇓
⇓
{Nb}Kb
• ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯→ •
Figure 2.1 - Needham-Schroeder Protocol
This brief introduction into the notation used in strand space analysis suffices to
demonstrate how a protocol is represented. Later in this chapter, this notation is used to
show the Kerberos protocol (Figure 3) in detail. Next, incoming and outgoing tests are
described. These tests are the foundation of the authentication tests.
2.3.2 Understanding the Penetrator
First, to help understand why the authentication tests are important, it is now
necessary to explain what the tests help protocol designers guard against. The penetrator
is understood to be the person(s) who is trying to perform any unwanted action during an
exchange. Dolev-Yao [26] have formalized what are understood to be widely accepted
9

capabilities of the penetrator. This formalization is termed the Dolev-Yao threat model.
Because the focus here is not on the mathematical soundness of encryption, it is
understood that the penetrator is actually a legitimate party on the network simply out to
do no good, so we term this person: Malice. What can Malice do?
•

Malice can obtain any message passing through the network

•

Malice is a legitimate user and can initiate conversations, and is expected at one
time, to be a recipient of an initiated conversation

•

Malice can impersonate any principal and thus send messages on their behalf to
any other principle on the network

Dolev-Yao also explicitly state what Malice can not do:
•

Malice cannot guess a random number (i.e. the mathematics of the encryption is
assumed to be ideal)

•

Malice cannot decrypt properly encrypted messages without possessing the proper
key; Malice cannot generate encrypted text on behalf of a user without his or her
proper key

•

Malice cannot ascertain the correct corresponding private key of any other user’s
public key

2.3.3 Authentication Tests
Now that we understand what we are guarding against, we can move onto the
authentication tests themselves. To understand the authentication tests it is necessary to
understand three simple tests: outgoing, incoming and unsolicited [4]. It is these three
tests that form the foundation of the authentication tests.
10

The key component that these tests work with is called a test component. The formal
definition of a test component is shown below [4]:

Definition: t = {h}k is a test component for a in n if:
1. a ⊂ t and t is a component of n;
2. The tem t is not a proper subterm of a component of any regular node
n′ ∈ ∑.
What this states in laymen’s terms is that a principal generates some a, and it is a’s
existence in a component that differentiates between a routine component and a test
component. The transmission or reception of this test component is how we ascertain
whether an incoming, outgoing or unsolicited test occurred.
An “outgoing test for a in t” is when a test component t that contains a uniquely
originating value a is sent out and a is received back in cryptographically altered form
called t’ (Figure 2.2); (cryptographically altered form means that the initial message is
decrypted by someone possessing the proper key and subsequently altered) the
conclusion is that an authorized recipient received the message, decrypted it, extracted
the value a and transmitted it back. This conclusion relies on the assumption that the
decryption key, K-1, is safe, or not compromised by an attacker, and therefore only a
regular (authorized) user could perform the decryption. The uniquely originating value,
in this case a, which is a very large randomly generated number, has very little chance of
being guessed by another party. The uniquely originating term is indicated by the * and
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we represent the outgoing test as: {…a…}K ~ …a… where a is the uniquely originating
value.
A *a ⊂ {h}K = t
• −−−−−−−−−→
⇓
a ⊂ t′
• ←−−−−−−−−−
Figure 2.2 - Outgoing Test
Coincidentally, the creation of this unique number is very common. A regular use of this
unique value is as a nonce or numbers once; because of their size and randomness, they
are commonly used as session keys. The unaltered portion of the message is this
uniquely created value because it is possible that the intended recipient concatenates
other values to the original message. With regard to the graph representation, the part of
a strand that receives a and sends it back altered is referred to as a transforming edge.
The part of a strand that sends a out and receives it back altered is referred to as a
transformed edge. A transformed edge containing a uniquely originating term in the
sending node is called a test.
The incoming test works in a similar fashion. Given some a transmitted in either plain
or encrypted form, if it is received back unaltered but within a test component properly
encrypted by an uncompromised symmetric key, we conclude that a regular recipient
performed the encryption. We write this as: …a… ~ {…a…}Kab. The unsolicited test is
inherently weaker in nature. It states that whenever a test component { t }K is received,
assuming that symmetric key K is safe, then the term could only have originated on a
regular strand. Since the graphical representation of the protocol is acyclic, this
12

originating node is located somewhere before the reception node. We show this as: ~
{…a…}Kba. These three tests provide the groundwork for understanding how the
authentication tests work. Since the purpose of this research is to generate a tool that
automates security protocol verification, the following are the formal definitions for
authentication tests and are drawn directly from [2]:
Authentication Test 1: Let C be a bundle with n′ ∈ C, and let n ⇒+ n′ be an outgoing
test for a in t.
1. There exist regular nodes m, m′ ∈ C such that t is a component of m and m ⇒+ m′ is
a transforming edge for a.
2. Suppose in addition that a occurs only in component t1 = {h1}K1 of m′, that t1 is
not a proper subterm of any regular component, and that K1¯¹ ∉ P. Then there is a
regular node with t1 as a component.
Authentication Test 2: Let C be a bundle with n′ ∈ C, and let n ⇒+ n′ be an incoming
test for a in t′. Then there exist regular nodes m, m′ ∈ C such that t′ is a component of m′
and m ⇒+ m′ is a transforming edge for a.
Authentication Test 3: Let C be a bundle with n ∈ C, and let n be an unsolicited test for
t = {h}K. Then there exists a positive regular node m ∈ C such that t is a component of
m.
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2.3.4 Tests Applied to Needham-Schroeder
This section shows how these tests are visible in an actual Protocol. Although the
Needham-Schroeder is described later on in great detail, it serves as a good tool to further
understand how the tests work.

A {Na, A}Kb = t
B
• ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯→ •
“Transformed Edge”→ ⇓ {Na, Nb}Ka = t’ * ⇓ ←”Transforming Edge”
*= t’ w/ respect to A,= t w/ respect to B
• ←⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ •
”Transforming Edge”→ ⇓ {Nb}Kb = t’
⇓ ←”Transformed Edge”
• ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯→ •
Figure 2.3 – Annotated Needham-Schroeder
Working from Figure 2.3, in the first line, A is sending his test component out. The
message {A Na}Kb is valid as a test component for reasons described in Section 2.3.3.
(The a in this example is represented by Na.) The component is received by B, who then
transforms the term through decryption, alteration and re-encryption (only the end result
is shown). With respect to the SSM, this constitutes the transforming edge. A’s receipt
of this new component, with respect to the SSM, is the transformed edge. The receipt of
this new component in this protocol represents two actions: The first is the completion of
A’s outgoing test and the second is B’s transmission of his own test component. Because
A has received his test component back altered, only through proper decryption, he can
infers a proper principal performed the transformation thus completing his outgoing test.
A then takes over the role as ‘transforming edge’ with respect to B’s test component: {Na
14

Nb}Ka, with the a, for B’s test component, represented as Nb. A decrypts, alters and reencrypts B’s test component, then retransmits the new component back to B. Once B
receives his new component back, he goes through the same evaluation proofs as A and
thus concludes a proper principal performed the transformation and concludes an
outgoing test has occurred.
2.4 Security Protocol Examples
The strand space methodology enables the modeling of security protocols as graphs.
This section describes two security protocols represented in the context of strand spaces.
The two protocols are: Needham-Schroeder [2] and Kerberos [13]. However, in an effort
to illustrate the use of strand spaces with a particular protocol, more emphasis is placed
on the Needham-Schroeder protocol as this protocol is routinely studied and analyzed in
the context of strand spaces [2, 4 and 5].
2.4.1 Types of Protocols
Clark and Jacob identify basic categories that protocols fit into: Symmetric or
Asymmetric cryptography, employing either trusted third parties or simply two
communicating principals [29]. For the purpose of this research only the main three
protocol types are reviewed. They are: Symmetric Key with Trusted Third Party,
Symmetric Key without Trusted Third Party and Public Key. Symmetric key with trusted
third party is demonstrated in the Kerberos protocol. In this protocol, the session keys
are generated by a server and then distributed to the requesting parties. There exists an
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understanding that each party has its own secure symmetric key for use when
communicating with the server.
The symmetric key without trusted third party is best demonstrated in challengeresponse protocols. The way Needham-Schroeder is shown in Figure 2.1, it could be
construed as a challenge response protocol had the keys been symmetric vice
asymmetric. The reason is, had the keys been symmetric, it would imply that the
communicating parties each had prior knowledge of the key they intend to use with no
server generating it for them. However, Needham-Schroeder does use asymmetric
cryptographic techniques with a trusted third party.
2.4.2 Needham-Schroeder Protocol
The Needham-Schroeder [24] public key protocol is represented in Figure 2.1. Later
in Chapter 4, this protocol is shown with the server. A description of the protocol
represented in Figure 2.1 is as follows: The parameters A and B represent
communicating principals. The parameter N represents a nonce. The letter following K
is indicating which node’s public key is used. In the Needham Schroeder protocol, A
sends B a nonce encrypted with B’s public key. Along with this, A sends B his signature;
in this case a signature is simply some agreed upon identifier which each party can use to
know who they are speaking to. Node B decrypts the message and replies by sending A
the original nonce along with a new nonce generated by B, all encrypted with A’s public
key. Node A decrypts the message and sends B his nonce back, encrypted with B’s public
key. Once these events happen, it is now understood that A and B are communicating.
However, it is not implied that this is a secure sequence of events. In fact, it is shown [9,
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2 and 5] that strands termed penetrator strands are capable of infiltrating a session. The
penetrator strand represents an unauthorized party who has infiltrated a session. The
effect of infiltration varies significantly based upon the importance or sensitivity of the
session.
2.4.3 Penetration of Needham-Schroeder Defined
The penetration of the Needham-Schroeder occurs as follows [Figure 2.4]: Assume
that A wants to talk to another party. In this case, we’ll call that party P. A then initiates
a conversation with P, who then encrypts/forwards A’s information over to party B. Party
B, thinking A initiated a conversation with him, will then answer the challenge with a
reply, and also issue his own challenge. A receives this message and assumes it came
from P and then replies to P with the correct response. P then encrypts/forwards this new
information over to B who sees it as the correct information.

P
{Na, A}Kb
B
A {Na, A}Kp
• ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯→ • ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯→ •
⇓
⇓
{Na, Nb}Ka
• ←⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ •
⇓
{Nb}Kp
{Nb}Kb
⇓
• ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯→ • ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯→ •
Figure 2.4 - Needham-Schroeder Penetrated
Now, both parties are convinced they are talking to their intended audience. However,
P now has the nonces from each party and is able to eavesdrop on a conversation between
A and B or simply converse with B while impersonating A. In [9], Lowe proposes that
B’s reply contain his identifier: ( { Na, Nb, B}Ka ). This will allow A to see that
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somehow his information is going to an unintended party and deduce that P is probably
malicious.
2.4.4 Kerberos
Kerberos is an authentication service for open network systems first proposed by
Miller and Neuman [14]. It involves three principals: user, client and server. The basic
process works as follows. A user desiring a service or program contacts the client. The
client can be anything from a program to a person. The client then contacts the server on
behalf of the user. Kerberos, using private key encryption, derives a private key from the
users’ password. This key, along with all other users’ keys, is stored in a Kerberosmanaged database. Any network service requiring authentication is registered with
Kerberos. Also important to note, Kerberos maintains a list of registered clients, which
corresponds with a particular key. What is evident here is that Kerberos acts as the
middleman between registered clients. Another role Kerberos plays is the generation of
session keys. Unlike the private keys, session keys are only temporary keys used within
a limited timeframe, as stated earlier; nonces are often used for session keys.
It is now demonstrated how Kerberos handles a request for communication between
two parties. A first requests a session key from the authentication server that it can then
use to communicate with B. The session key is a uniquely originating key, which is
ideally used for only one session. First, A sends the authentication server, AS, its identity
and the identity of whom it wants to communicate with. AS then generates a symmetric
session key, it encrypts the session key and B’s identity with A’s key. It then encrypts the
session key and A’s identity with B’s key (Figure 2.5). It then sends both encrypted
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messages to A. At this point, A decrypts the session key encrypted with A’s key,
generates a time stamp, encrypts the time stamp with the newly acquired session key and
sends both packages off to B. Now, A and B are able to communicate in a secure fashion.
With respect to the authentication tests, Kerberos uses the incoming and unsolicited
tests. This determination is made by the fact that A sends out plaintext and receives it
back properly encrypted. This is an example of the incoming test. With respect to
incoming tests, sending something out plain and receiving it back encrypted does not
imply symmetric cryptography; if that protocol uses asymmetric cryptography then any
party can encrypt a plain message with a public key and one cannot conclude an
incoming test occurred because you cannot be sure who did the encrypting. However in
Kerberos, A shares a symmetric key with AS therefore we conclude the AS did the
encrypting. B receives an un-requested message properly encrypted by A; this is an
example of an unsolicited test. This protocol does not contain any outgoing tests, but it is
not a requirement that all tests be represented in a protocol. The presence of these tests
also does not guarantee that Kerberos is a ‘good’ protocol. The original NeedhamSchroeder contained outgoing tests with respect to both parties but still demonstrated a
serious flaw due to the contents of the messages themselves.
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A
{A, B}Kas
AS
B
• ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯→ •
{A, SK}Kbs, {FS, SK}Kas⇓
• ←⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ •
⇓
{A, SK}Kbs, {Time-stamp}SK
• ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯→ •
Figure 2.5 - Kerberos Communication Initialization
2.5 Related Work in the Automation of Security Protocol Verification
Automating security protocol verification allows for quicker determinations of the
weaknesses and strengths of a particular protocol. Numerous researchers [11] have
proposed applying formal proof techniques towards the analysis of security protocols.
The next sections briefly cover key work that has been successful in the automation of
security protocol verification.
The techniques employed in protocol analysis, covered in this review, typically fall
into two categories. They are model checking and theorem proving. In the model
checking approach, one searches for desired states by modeling the protocol and
executing it in every possible way. In the theorem proving approach, one creates a search
tree and checks for the existence of the theories in that tree at some state. The Multi-Set
Rewriting and Failure Divergence Refinement [22] checking typically fall into the model
checking camp. The Athena approach [11] falls into the theorem proving camp. The
approach in this research falls into the theorem approach because it automatically
identifies where the authentication test theorems can be applied.
20

2.5.1 Failure Divergences Refinement Checker
Lowe [9] successfully analyses the Needham-Schroeder protocol using the Failure
Divergences Refinement Checker (FDR), which is a model checker for Communicating
Sequential Processes (CSP) [25]. CSP is a language that allows easy representation of
pattern interaction. Using CSP, Lowe tests whether a protocol achieves authentication.
In the case of an attacker being discovered [9], Lowe is also able to show that the fixed
protocol is secure.
2.5.2 Process Calculus
In [1], Blanchet uses an extension of pi-calculus to represent protocols. Pi-calculus is
“a ‘process algebra’ in which channel names can act both as transmission medium and as
transmitted data” [23]. His results show promise in that automated protocol verification
can be done in less than one second. The user needs only to correctly code whatever
protocol they intend to evaluate. The tool, OCaml 3.04 [1], translates the protocol into
Horn clauses and then executes it against rules based on whatever that particular protocol
defines as a rule. This is obviously much faster than traditional methods of hand proving.
Blanchet also permits an unbounded number of sessions within the test, whereas previous
work has limited the number of session due to infinite state systems. On rare occasions
the algorithm will not terminate and it can even fail on correct protocols. However, it is
Blanchet’s conjecture that it will terminate for a large class of protocols.
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2.5.3 Athena
Athena is an automated checking algorithm that analyzes security protocols [12].
Athena implements a specialized logic for expressing security properties such as
authentication, secrecy and properties related to electronic commerce [12]. Athena works
by terminating and providing a proof on well-formed formulas or generating a counter
example on well-formed formulas that evaluate to false. Although there are other formal
techniques for analyzing security protocols [11], Athena differs in the sense that it can
directly evaluate the strand space model without succumbing to the state space explosion
[11, 2.5.1]. State space explosion occurs whenever there is an unbounded number of
initiators/responders and sessions thus creating an unreachable theorem [18]. Athena
uses ‘unreachability theorems’ to ‘prune’ the state space, thus reducing the number of
states and increasing the probability of terminating [12]. Another method Song uses to
reduce the state space is that of the Strand Space Model (SSM) [28]. By using the causal
relationships developed by Guttman in the SSM, Song is able to further prune the state
space. Song shows that although limited due to its inability to allow certain terms to be
encrypted, Guttman and Thayer’s tests are still effective in reducing the state space.
2.5.4 Security Modeling in Maude
Object modeling software is another effective way to model protocol transactions.
One example of automated modeling software is Maude [19]. Maude was the intended
language for this research, but Java proved very effective. However, for future research
it is highly recommended that using Maude to automate authentication tests be
performed, as this is now explained. Developed primarily at the University of Illinois
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and Stanford Research Institute, Maude’s purpose is stated as follows: “…supporting
formal executable specification, declarative programming, and a wide range of formal
methods as means to achieve high-quality systems in areas much as: software
engineering, networks, distributed computing, bioinformatics, and formal tool
development.” [19].
Specifically, Maude is a “high-performance reflective language, which supports both
equational and rewriting logic specifications” [19]. Being a reflective language means
that Maude can program or manipulate itself [20]. Rewriting logic allows for concurrent
state computations. Although a protocol is pre-defined at run time, concurrent state
computations allows for rules or equational rewrites to occur simultaneously.
In [27], Denker and Meseguer show how protocols can be effectively modeled using
object-oriented specification in Maude. The purpose of his work is to show that Maude’s
ability to perform rewritable logic and concurrent execution is helpful in uncovering
security flaws in protocols. The paper uses the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol
as the case study. Meseguer implements a bounded depth first search on multiple
instances of protocol runs. The depth first search shows efficient searching of possible
attacks on the multiple run is an effective means of ascertaining a weakness on a given
protocol. In this case, the weakness discovered by Lowe [9] is found using a depth first
search. In this example we see Maude being used as a model checker. However, Maude
can also be used for theorem checking. Because Maude is powerful enough to handle
either method of use, it allows for multiple means in which modeling the authentication
tests can be done.
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2.5.5 Multi-Set Rewriting
In [22], Cervesato et al. use multi-set rewriting to provide a means to specify ‘finite
length’ protocols. In his work, Cervesato uses the multi-set rewriting to extend the strand
space formalism. Through this he is able to model penetrator capabilities, as defined by
Dolev-Yao, and then relate the intruder theory to penetrator strands as defined within the
context of strand space modeling. This particular work serves as a means to further
understand the Dolev-Yao threat model.
2.6 Summary
This chapter outlines what a strand space is and how it is represented using graph
theory notation. It then shows how this notation is used to represent a security protocol.
The Needham-Schroeder and Kerberos protocols were used to illustrate the use of strand
spaces. Next, three authentication tests were defined from [5]. There are three tests—
outgoing, incoming and unsolicited—and each has a theorem describing the guarantees it
provides. Finally, previous work in automating aspects of security protocol analysis has
been discussed.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the methods that are employed in
automating the authentication tests developed by Guttman et al [2, 5]. This chapter
describes the Security Protocol Analyzer (SPA) tool developed for the purpose of this
research. The chapter also shows SPA’s analysis of a representative set of known
protocols and basic examples in order to establish a baseline of reliability. In Chapter 4,
a much more diverse set of protocols is analyzed.
This chapter is laid out in the following manner:
•

Problem Review

•

Overview of software used

•

Java based protocol analysis

•

Demonstration of tests in the following environments:
o Numerous one and two pass tests
o Needham-Schroeder

•

Summary

3.2 Problem Review
The problem that this research addresses is the effective automation of security
protocol analysis, and in particular, the automatic recognition of authentication tests as
defined by Guttman et al. Guttman et al have developed three authentication tests that
greatly simplify the tedious pen-and-paper proofs normally required to show if a security
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protocol has certain correctness properties. This research takes the next step and
automates aspects of their work. In the previous chapter, these tests and correctness
properties have been defined and now the focus will shift to how occurrences of these
tests are automatically identified using a tool developed in Java.
3.3 Software Overview
The Java-based protocol analyzer was developed using the Java development
environment TogetherSoft® version 6.0. This application was executed on a Windows®
2000 operating system. The version of Java that TogetherSoft® 6.0 employs is 1.3.1.
3.4 Java Based Protocol Analysis
The protocol analyzer uses a traditional software development approach of objectoriented programming. The analyzer uses dynamically created objects to represent
different component classes, such as Principals, Messages and Text. The next few
sections outline the algorithm and the specific techniques used in the creation of the tool.
3.4.1 Layout of Java Program
The Java-based program, called Security Protocol Analyzer (SPA), can be divided into
two portions. The first portion is the parsing portion. The second portion is as the
analysis portion.
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Table 1 – Brief Description of SPA classes
Class:

Brief Description:

ProtocolAnalyzer Main driver of program. Contains main().
Encryption
Protocol
Message
Sequence
Term

Text
Parser
Principal

Checks encryption of messages against receiver and sender. Ensures
proper parties are viewing messages.
This is the root node of an abstract syntax tree representing a
protocol. It contains a list of Messages.
An instance of message is instantiated as each message is read in
from the input file. A message consists of a sender, a receiver and
the term sent.
Since messages exist as concatenations of terms, we call this a
sequence. This class contains an iterator which is traversed during
analysis on instances of Sequence.
The primary abstract class that enables Text, Encryption, and
Sequence to generically create functions for recursive use. Two key
methods for analysis, GetReadableText() and GetTextObj(), are
established here.
This class represents individual instances of each text. If tagged with
a * in the input file, a flag condition is set to show its new/fresh
characteristic.
This class checks the syntax of the input file and verifies if it is legal
or not. It also builds an abstract syntax tree rooted at an instance of
the Protocol class.
For each occurrence of a party within a protocol transaction, an
instance of principal is generated. Within it, the test conditions are
checked within the addnonce() method as components get passed.

The main role of the parsing portion is to retrieve a file and import the contents into
“iterators” that the analyzer steps through and analyzes. It also builds the abstract syntax
tree (AST), which is traversed during the analysis portion. The parsing method could
have been done numerous ways therefore not much attention is given to the specifics in
this thesis but the authentication tests are strictly defined and hence that is where our
focus lies. Table 1 lays out brief descriptions of key classes in the SPA. Sections 3.4.2
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and 3.4.3 go into detailed specifics of the more important operations and give a more
thorough description of the key classes as seen in the SPA class diagram, Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1 – Class Diagram of SPA
3.4.2 Description of Parsing Operation
The parsing of the SPA is performed as follows: An input file (Figure 3.2) is parsed
line by line into an abstract syntax tree with a Protocol object as the root. A Protocol
consists of a list of Message objects. Each Message contains three portions: from, to and
the message itself. It is this list of messages that we walk through during the analysis
portion.
A -> B : {A *Na1}Kb
B -> A : {Na1 *Nb1}Ka
A -> B: {Nb1} Kb
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Figure 3.2 – Needham-Schroeder Protocol Input File
Figure 3.3 shows an example of the abstract syntax tree created during the initial
parsing of a message. As seen in Figure 3.3, whenever a message is broken down, an
instance of Sequence, Encryption or Text is created. Due to the recursive structure of
message terms, within Encryption and Sequence lie further instances of Sequence,
Encryption or Text. The breakdown process continues recursively until individual Text
instances are all that remain. The parsing of the input file into AST’s completes the
initial run of the SPA with respect to the input file. The next operation performed is the
analysis portion.

Figure 3.3 – UML of Message Breakout

3.4.3 Description of Analysis Operation
This section covers the key classes that perform the main analysis. The
ProtocolAnalyzer, Principal and Term classes are what drive the analysis portion of the
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program. The ProtocolAnalyzer class contains the main() function and hence is the
driver for the program. The program makes several passes through the list of messages
during the analysis portion.
The first pass through the message list checks for potentially disqualifying conditions.
For instance, one of the more common conditions is occurrence of an encrypted term
within another encrypted term, thus negating the inner one’s use as a test component in
accordance with criteria outlined by Guttman [5] and described in Chapter 2. The SPA
takes this encrypted term and stores it in a vector with any other disqualified encrypted
terms. If an encrypted term is not disqualified it is stored in another vector which
contains potential test components. Later on, these vectors are viewed to determine if a
component received by a Principal is disqualified as a test component or not.
The second pass through the message list creates instances of the Principal class and
stores them in a vector. Recall that during the parsing process, each line of the input file
generates a from, to and message. The from and to are used to create these instantiations
of Principal. For example, using the example in Figure 3.2, in Figure 3.3 A and B are
created as different instances of Principal. However, the parser first checks to make sure
a previous existence of that Principal does not exist, that way only one instantiation per
principal occurs. By having individual instantiations for each participant in the protocol,
this allows each party to know what terms and components it has sent and received.
The third pass is where actual analysis of individual terms occurs. Using Figure 3.2 as
an illustration, whenever the first line is analyzed, individual terms A and Na (parsed into
an AST as described earlier), are stored individually in a sent items vector of A’s
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instantiation of Principal. B’s instantiation of Principal will store them in a received
items vector. As the SPA iterates through the list of messages, each principal, depending
on its role as sender or receiver, checks its vectors of sent and received items and then
applies the rules of the tests against that item. With respect to Figure 3.2, the SPA
output generated is shown in Figure 3.4. This serves as a good overview regarding the
analysis operation but there are two key functions that allow this to operate so effectively.
The first key function is the GetReadableText() function. The analyzer calls the
GetReadableText() function initially in main() to initiate the third pass, but as described
shortly, the SPA actually traverses the tree through recursive calls of GetReadableText().
This recursion happens because the GetReadableText() function is an abstract function
stemming from abstract class Term. In order to allow more effective analysis without
duplication of functionality, Term was developed as an abstract class from which
Encryption, Text and Sequence are all extended. As the analyzer starts at the top of the
AST, based on whatever instantiation lies at that particular node, the SPA knows what
class’ GetReadableText() function to call. From within this Term, it steps down to the
next node and the SPA then calls that particular instance of GetReadableText(). This is
especially important for encrypted terms. If the analyzer is on an encrypted node, it will
determine if the receiver can view the message through string comparisons on the key
and Principals identity (For example: Ka is viewable by A only). As the analyzer steps
further down the tree, based on the results of whether a Principal can read the encrypted
portion or not, the analyzer will know which information to pass into that Principals
instantiation, thus, a received item, if not readable, will not be entered into a receiver’s
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vector of received terms! (The actual addition of individual text into a principals’
relevant vectors is done through the addNonce() function, described shortly.) Once the
end node of the AST is reached, we know from earlier that this will be an instance of an
individual Text. At this point, when GetReadableText() is called, the values of the
arguments at this point are now ready to be added directly into each Principal’s relevant
vectors.
Within the Text class’ GetReadableText() function is called the other key function:
addNonce(). AddNonce() is a method of the Principal class that is only called from
within each individual instance of Text. In addNonce(), the following arguments get
passed in: the vectors of bad test components, good test components, the name of the
individual Text currently being analyzed, as determined by being at the bottom of the
AST, and whether or not the sender/receiver can read the individual Text.
GetReadableText() of that particular instance of Text will traverse the vector of Principals
then whenever sender and receiver get matched, that particular Principal has its
addNonce() function called. It is within addNonce(), since we are getting all the key
information at this time for this particular Text, that the existence of the tests with
relation to this particular Text are determined. The determination of the existence of tests
follows strictly the criteria defined by Guttman [5] and covered extensively in Chapter 2.
3.5 Specific Protocols analyzed using Java
In this section, the SPA is tested with simple input to demonstrate its ability to find
examples of the authentication tests under a variety of basic conditions. For example,
simple one-pass and two-pass runs are performed using both asymmetric and symmetric
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cryptography. The chapter then culminates with the SPA running the NeedhamSchroeder protocol in both a normal setting and a setting with intentional flaws. Once
these tests are completed, a reliable baseline is established for use of the SPA in
identifying occurrences of outgoing, incoming and unsolicited tests in unfamiliar
protocols.
3.5.1 Verifying Presence of Tests
In the first example, A executes an incoming test. A sends out plain text and receives
it back properly encrypted with a symmetric key, thus completing an incoming test. The
layout for all tests is similar in nature. The SPA shows encryption keys used then
proceeds to identify the existence of any tests or errors.
File Contents:
A -> B : *Na1 A
B -> A : {Na1 B}Kab
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : *Na1 A
Sender may be attempting to initiate an incoming test by transmitting Na1 in the clear.
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> A : {Na1 B}Kab
Encrypt term(s) < Na1 B > with key Kab is readable by both sender/receiver.
The unencrypted/fresh nonce Na1 has been received back in new component: {Na1 B}Kab
Incoming test for A because fresh term Na1 was sent out earlier in < Na1 >

In this example, a simple two-pass run of an outgoing test is demonstrated:
File Contents:
A -> B : {*Na1 A}Kab
B -> A : Na1 B
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : {*Na1 A}Kab
Encrypt term(s) < *Na1 A > with key Kab is readable by both sender/receiver.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Na1 in encrypted form.
Unsolicited test for B because of nonce Na1 within test component < {Na1 A}Kab >
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> A : Na1 B
The encrypted/fresh nonce Na1 has been received back in new component: Na1

33

Outgoing test for A because fresh term Na1 was sent out earlier in < {Na1 A}Kab >

In the first pass, the SPA identifies what key is used for encryption and states which
parties can view that part of the message. Then, it states that the sender may be initiating
an outgoing test. Also, based on the use of symmetric cryptography, as indicated by the
key format, it also indicates the presence of an unsolicited test from B’s perspective. B
transforms the message through decryption, once again, assuming the key is safe, then
retransmits it back to A. Finally, it shows A completing an outgoing test because he is
receiving his fresh nonce back in altered form.
In the below example, a simple case of nested encryption is used to demonstrate
another example of an outgoing test. In this case, A’s fresh nonce is inside an encrypted
term, which is itself encrypted. On the first pass, the SPA shows both terms’ encryption
keys and states how A is attempting to initiate an outgoing test. On the second pass, the
SPA verifies that A has completed his outgoing test. Notice on this pass there is no
unsolicited test because the communicating parties are using asymmetric cryptography,
as indicated by their key format. Recall from Chapter 2, all public keys are assumed to
be compromised. Also, although not shown by the SPA, the validity of this test depends
on B’s private key not being compromised.
File Contents:
A -> B : A {{*Na1}Ka}Kb
B -> A : {Na1}Ka
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : A {{*Na1}Ka}Kb
Encrypted term(s) < {*Na1}Ka > with key Kb is readable by recipient only.
Encrypted term(s) < *Na1 > with key Ka is readable by sender only.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Na1 in encrypted form.
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> A : {Na1}Ka
Encrypted term(s) < Na1 > with key Ka is readable by recipient only.
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The encrypted/fresh nonce Na1 has been received back in new component: {Na1}Ka
Outgoing test for A because fresh term Na1 was sent out earlier in < {{Na1}Ka}Kb >

The next example is a more common example of what one would expect during a
routine transaction using symmetric cryptography. In the example, it shows the
unsolicited test that exists due to the symmetric cryptography used, as indicated by the
key format used, but more importantly because of the valid test component received by
B. The only thing to note here is the phrase incoming/outgoing test. This is not a new
test. Recall from Chapter 2, the outgoing test is sent out encrypted and received back
altered, possibly unencrypted; the incoming test is sent out in either format but received
back encrypted. Therefore, this example fulfills the requirements of both tests and could
be called either, thus it is termed an outgoing/incoming test!
File Contents:
A -> B : {*Na1 A}Kab
B -> A : {Na1 B}Kab
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : {*Na1 A}Kab
Encrypt term(s) < *Na1 A > with key Kab is readable by both sender/receiver.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Na1 in encrypted form.
Unsolicited test for B because of nonce Na1 within test component < {Na1 A}Kab >
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> A : {Na1 B}Kab
Encrypt term(s) < Na1 B > with key Kab is readable by both sender/receiver.
The encrypted/fresh nonce Na1 has been received back in new component: {Na1 B}Kab
Outgoing/Incoming test for A because fresh term Na1 was sent out earlier in < {Na1 A}Kab >

In this next example, it appears as though there should be a simple incoming test.
However, this is not the case. A sends out an unencrypted fresh term and receives it back
encrypted. The SPA indicates that principal A may be attempting to initiate an incoming
test; however, because everyone knows public keys, A cannot be sure who encrypted his
plain text. The SPA’s adherence to the notion of compromised public keys, as discussed
in Chapter 2, disallows a completed incoming test.
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File Contents:
A -> B : *Na1 A
B -> A : {Na1 B}Ka
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : *Na1 A
Sender may be attempting to initiate an incoming test by transmitting Na1 in the clear.
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> A : {Na1 B}Ka
Encrypted term(s) < Na1 B > with key Ka is readable by recipient only.

The final example is very similar to the earlier one in which a term is sent out
encrypted and received back altered. This represents an outgoing test for A because test
component {*Na1 A}Kb is transmitted to B. B receives the test component, based on the
input file composition, transforms the test component into {Na1 B}Ka and transmits it
back to A. Since encryption is correct and private keys are assumed safe, we see a valid
instance of an outgoing test.
File Contents:
A -> B : A {*Na1 A}Kb
B -> A : B {Na1 B}Ka
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : A {*Na1 A}Kb
Encrypted term(s) < *Na1 A > with key Kb is readable by recipient only.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Na1 in encrypted form.
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> A : B {Na1 B}Ka
Encrypted term(s) < Na1 B > with key Ka is readable by recipient only.
The encrypted/fresh nonce Na1 has been received back in new component: {Na1 B}Ka
Outgoing test for A because fresh term Na1 was sent out earlier in < {Na1 A}Kb >

3.5.2 Analyzing Needham-Schroeder
The above examples showed different examples of the outgoing, incoming and
unsolicited tests. In this section we expand upon this by running an actual protocol
through the SPA. The result of normally operating the Needham-Schroeder protocol in
the SPA confirms the previously known existence [5] of outgoing tests in the protocol.
Figure 3.4 shows the entire output for the original Needham-Schroeder protocol.
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A -> B : {*Na1 A}Kb
B -> A : {Na1 *Nb1}Ka
A -> B : {Nb1}Kb
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : {*Na1 A}Kb
Encrypted term(s) < *Na1 A > with key Kb is readable by recipient only.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Na1 in encrypted form.
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> A : {Na1 *Nb1}Ka
Encrypted term(s) < Na1 *Nb1 > with key Ka is readable by recipient only.
The encrypted/fresh nonce Na1 has been received back in new component: {Na1 Nb1}Ka
Outgoing test for A because fresh term Na1 was sent out earlier in < {Na1 A}Kb >
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Nb1 in encrypted form.
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : {Nb1}Kb
Encrypted term(s) < Nb1 > with key Kb is readable by recipient only.
The encrypted/fresh nonce Nb1 has been received back in new component: {Nb1}Kb
Outgoing test for B because fresh term Nb1 was sent out earlier in < {Na1 Nb1}Ka >

Figure 3.4 – Output of running Needham-Schroeder in SPA
Although there are no surprises here, it is important that an actual protocol was run.
From this, we are now able to move forward and test protocols where outcomes may not
necessarily be expected. The final test is to run the Needham-Schroeder protocol in
slightly altered form, then using already known results [5], verify that the analyzer
generated the correct results.
In this next test we present an altered form of Needham-Schroeder. In Figure 3.5, we
see several different erroneous/mischievous activities being performed. The first is
principal C trying to resend a previous message. The SPA generates no notice on this
because it cannot assume this was intentional. It may simply be acting as a relay. From
the legitimate test, it recognizes that A has received his fresh nonce back and therefore
won’t reregister this as another outgoing test. The next activity is that of B trying to
initiate a conversation using A’s old nonce; once again no test is registered. These
duplicate transactions do occur several more times but to no avail.
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A -> B : {A *Na}Kb
B -> A : {Na *Nb}Ka
C -> A : {Na Nb}Ka
B -> A : {B Na}Ka
A -> B : {Na}Kb
A -> B : {Nb}Kb
A -> C : {Nb}Kc
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : {A *Na}Kb
Encrypted term(s) < A *Na > with key Kb is readable by recipient only.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Na in encrypted form.
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> A : {Na *Nb}Ka
Encrypted term(s) < Na *Nb > with key Ka is readable by recipient only.
The encrypted/fresh nonce Na has been received back in new component: {Na Nb}Ka
Outgoing test for A because fresh term Na was sent out earlier in < {A Na}Kb >
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Nb in encrypted form.
<Parties> : <Message> >> C -> A : {Na Nb}Ka
Encrypted term(s) < Na Nb > with key Ka is readable by recipient only.
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> A : {B Na}Ka
Encrypted term(s) < B Na > with key Ka is readable by recipient only.
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : {Na}Kb
Encrypted term(s) < Na > with key Kb is readable by recipient only.
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : {Nb}Kb
Encrypted term(s) < Nb > with key Kb is readable by recipient only.
The encrypted/fresh nonce Nb has been received back in new component: {Nb}Kb
Outgoing test for B because fresh term Nb was sent out earlier in < {Na Nb}Ka >
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> C : {Nb}Kc
Encrypted term(s) < Nb > with key Kc is readable by recipient only.

Figure 3.5 – Output of NS with duplicate transmission of nonce
We learn from this example that the SPA is not being fooled with repetitive transactions.
However, it is catching and printing the existence of the two legitimate outgoing tests that
occur. As one can see, there are numerous ways to arrange the order of these tests and
the components within, but at this point we can be fairly certain the SPA is capable of
finding the tests.
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3.6 Summary
In conclusion, this chapter covered in detail the basic operation of the SPA.
Numerous test cases and the Needham-Schroeder protocol were run and we use them to
establish a baseline of reliability. Finally, there was a modification done to the NeedhamSchroeder protocol to show that obvious mistakes in a transaction, whether intentional or
not, could be captured. As a result of these tests, we’ve shown that the SPA is capable of
detecting instances of incoming, outgoing and unsolicited authentication tests as well as
basic improper events occurring during the course of a protocol run. We also introduce
something termed outgoing/incoming test, which is the case where a received term meets
criteria for both outgoing and incoming tests as described in chapter two. In the next
chapter, we will expand upon this and run the SPA against numerous protocols that
exhibit numerous characteristics.
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IV. Analysis and Results
4.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter demonstrates the results of running the SPA on several regular protocol
runs. These tests show if any authentications tests occur in the protocol and where.
Following the discussion of normal protocol runs, several more ‘incorrect’, or seemingly
incorrect, protocol runs are investigated. The purpose of creating incorrect protocols is to
show that the SPA is capable of discovering erroneous scenarios that may occur in
protocols. The means by which these particular scenarios are chosen is discussed later.
4.2 Results of Protocol Analyses
This section covers the overall results of running known protocols. As discussed
earlier, protocols are grouped into categories. Categories can be broken up into protocols
that use symmetric cryptography verse asymmetric cryptography. Another category is
protocols which use trusted verse non-trusted third parties. Although there do exist
hybrid protocols, the protocols chosen most assuredly fit into the above categories. The
layout of the protocols is taken almost directly from [29].
In Chapter 3, outgoing, incoming and unsolicited tests output is shown in great detail.
In this section, since testing occurs on large established protocols, previously unseen
output is displayed. Although warnings and errors are self explanatory, there is another
test condition that is introduced that may not be self-evident. The test is called a pseudounsolicited test. This test does not alter the definition of an unsolicited test in any way,
but what it does do is show how one party is receiving a challenge from another that it
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has previously sent a message to. In other words, because both parties understand the
protocol, A may expect something back from B, in one case, the minimum reply might be
A’s fresh nonce. However, simultaneously if B solicits a challenge of his own, A must
now reply with the correct answer. The reason for the slight name change is based upon
the generic nature of the analyzer. This analyzer is able to review any protocol without
knowing how the protocol works. But because of this, it does have to keep track of
intercommunicating parties and know who is sending what to whom but does not
necessarily know that a reply or request is part of the protocol. Therefore, because a
party has sent something to another means receiving something back from the party is not
necessarily ‘unsolicited’.
4.2.1 Wide Mouth Frog Protocol
The wide mouth frog protocol (Figure 4.1) involves the use of symmetric
cryptography in conjunction with a trusted third party. In this protocol, the initiating
principal generates a temporary session key, along with a timestamp. These are passed to
the server, along with the identification of the party in which the initiating principal
wishes to communicate. The server then passes the timestamp and session key onto the
intended recipient.
The SPA recognizes all known tests. In the first message it correctly identifies the
fact that A may be attempting to initiate two different outgoing tests. This does not mean
they are completed; only that A is transmitting a legitimate test component that contains
two fresh terms. S’s receipt of this valid test component with two fresh terms inside and
the use of proper symmetric cryptography mean there exists two unsolicited tests from
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S’s perspective. In the second pass, S has created his own test component containing a
fresh nonce and thus may be initiating his own outgoing test. From B’s point of view, the
receipt of this test component with two fresh terms, one generated by S and the other by
A, means B has two unsolicited tests. In this example, the SPA accurately detects all
relevant tests that occur as shown in Figure 4.1.

A -> S : A {*Na1 B *Kab}Kas
S -> B : {*Ns1 A Kab}Kbs
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> S : A {*Na1 B *Kab}Kas
Encrypt term(s) < *Na1 B *Kab > with key Kas is readable by both sender/receiver.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Na1 in encrypted form.
Unsolicited test for S because of nonce Na1 within test component < {Na1 B Kab}Kas >
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Kab in encrypted form.
Unsolicited test for S because of nonce Kab within test component < {Na1 B Kab}Kas >
<Parties> : <Message> >> S -> B : {*Ns1 A Kab}Kbs
Encrypt term(s) < *Ns1 A Kab > with key Kbs is readable by both sender/receiver.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Ns1 in encrypted form.
Unsolicited test for B because of nonce Ns1 within test component < {Ns1 A Kab}Kbs >
Unsolicited test for B because of nonce Kab within test component < {Ns1 A Kab}Kbs >

Figure 4.1 -Wide-Mouth Frog Protocol
4.2.2 Yahalom Protocol
In the Yahalom protocol, the SPA starts out by showing how principal A is initiating
an incoming test by sending out a fresh term. The next message shows how B is
initiating his own outgoing test and at the same by doing so, an unsolicited test occurs for
the server, represented as S. Also, an unsolicited test occurs for nonce Na because it is
still fresh from S’s view and it exists within a valid test component. The next step then
shows how A gets its nonce, Na, back; thus completing the run of its incoming test. At
the same time, it shows an unsolicited test for A because of a fresh term within a valid
test component from S. In this pass, the first warning is generated. S has generated one
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key and is transmitting it in two separate components. Because of this, if S were to get
back one of these keys, it can not be certain from whom and therefore they are
invalidated as a test component with regard to outgoing tests. The final message sees an
unsolicited test for B as well as B’s receipt of his fresh nonce back completing a run of an
outgoing/incoming test.
The significance of running Yahalom in the SPA is that the SPA is challenged with
multiple parties, multiple test cases and an encounter with its first negated test component
and warning message. The results of the SPA were expected so therefore we conclude
that it has successfully completed analysis of this protocol.
A -> B : A *Na
B -> S : B {A Na *Nb}Kbs
S -> A : {B *Kab Na Nb}Kas {A *Kab}Kbs
A -> B : {A Kab}Kbs {Nb}Kab
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : A *Na
Sender may be attempting to initiate an incoming test by transmitting Na in the clear.
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> S : B {A Na *Nb}Kbs
Encrypt term(s) < A Na *Nb > with key Kbs is readable by both sender/receiver.
Unsolicited test for S because of nonce Na within test component < {A Na Nb}Kbs >
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Nb in encrypted form.
Unsolicited test for S because of nonce Nb within test component < {A Na Nb}Kbs >
<Parties> : <Message> >> S -> A : {B *Kab Na Nb}Kas {A *Kab}Kbs
Encrypt term(s) < B *Kab Na Nb > with key Kas is readable by both sender/receiver.
Unsolicited test for A because of nonce Kab within test component < {B Kab Na Nb}Kas >
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Kab in encrypted form.
The unencrypted/fresh nonce Na has been received back in new component: {B Kab Na Nb}Kas
Incoming test for A because fresh term Na was sent out earlier in < Na >
Unsolicited test for A because of nonce Nb within test component < {B Kab Na Nb}Kas >
Encrypted term(s) < A *Kab > with key Kbs is readable by sender only.
Warning: Sender is transmitting nonce Kab in two separate components, invalidating its use as an
outgoing test.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting an invalid Kab in encrypted
form.
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : {A Kab}Kbs {Nb}Kab
Encrypted term(s) < A Kab > with key Kbs is readable by recipient only.
Unsolicited test for B because of nonce Kab within test component < {A Kab}Kbs >
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Encrypt term(s) < Nb > with key Kab is readable by both sender/receiver.
The encrypted/fresh nonce Nb has been received back in new component: {Nb}Kab
Outgoing/Incoming test for B because fresh term Nb was sent out earlier in < {A Na Nb}Kbs >

Figure 4.2 – Yahalom Protocol
4.2.3 Woo-Lam Protocol
In this section, the Woo-Lam protocol is examined. From this point onward, rather
than explain line by line each protocol, only key events of the protocol and the SPA’s
conclusions are discussed. In Woo-Lam, which is already identified to have a flaw [5],
the SPA recognizes two tests. The first is the completed incoming test from B’s view.
The second is the unsolicited test from the servers’ point of view. However in Guttman’s
work, [5], he concludes that their does not exist a legitimate incoming test. This
reasoning is based on the notion that another node could produce a received component
of the same form. Since the SPA performs tests based on string comparisons, in a test
like this, type comparisons would be more beneficial. Hence, a model checking language
may prove more effective in this type of scenario.
A -> B : A
B -> A : *Nb1
A -> B : {Nb1}Kas
B -> S : {A {Nb1}Kas}Kbs
S -> B : {Nb1}Kbs
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : A
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> A : *Nb1
Sender may be attempting to initiate an incoming test by transmitting Nb1 in the clear.
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : {Nb1}Kas
Encrypted term(s) < Nb1 > with key Kas is readable by sender only.
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> S : {A {Nb1}Kas}Kbs
Encrypt term(s) < A {Nb1}Kas > with key Kbs is readable by both sender/receiver.
Encrypted term(s) < Nb1 > with key Kas is readable by recipient only.
Unsolicited test for S because of nonce Nb1 within test component < {Nb1}Kas >
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<Parties> : <Message> >> S -> B : {Nb1}Kbs
Encrypt term(s) < Nb1 > with key Kbs is readable by both sender/receiver.
The unencrypted/fresh nonce Nb1 has been received back in new component: {Nb1}Kbs
Incoming test for B because fresh term Nb1 was sent out earlier in < Nb1 >

Figure 4.3 – Woo-Lam Protocol
4.2.4 Neuman-Stubblebine Protocol
The next protocol reviewed is the Neuman-Stubblebine protocol. In this test, two
different scenarios are executed. The first (Figure 4.4) puts the * tag on the nonces and
session keys generated by the server and the ticket generated by B. In other words,
anything created fresh and unique is tagged in order to identify all potential tests. The
second run (Figure 4.5) shows the analysis done without placing the * on the keys and
tickets generated by the different parties. The reason for this is to show that in order to
detect the presence of tests, it is important that the analyzers of the protocol know what
they intend to use as unique/fresh terms, thus they have more flexibility when doing
analysis.
In the first test, numerous examples of unsolicited tests are shown due to the sheer
volume of freshly tagged terms. At this point, it is important to note that the SPA does
not disqualify any components but does make note of the fact that in step 3 a fresh term
(a key) is being transmitted in two components. Although this negates their validity as
outgoing tests, the SPA still makes the correct assessment and determines that unsolicited
tests involving these components do occur.
A -> B : A *Na
B -> S : B {A Na *tb}Kbs *Nb
S -> A : {B Na *Kab tb}Kas {A *Kab tb}Kbs Nb
A -> B : {A *Kab tb}Kbs {Nb}Kab
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : A *Na
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Sender may be attempting to initiate an incoming test by transmitting Na in the clear.
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> S : B {A Na *tb}Kbs *Nb
Encrypt term(s) < A Na *tb > with key Kbs is readable by both sender/receiver.
Unsolicited test for S because of nonce Na within test component < {A Na tb}Kbs >
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting tb in encrypted form.
Unsolicited test for S because of nonce tb within test component < {A Na tb}Kbs >
Sender may be attempting to initiate an incoming test by transmitting Nb in the clear.
<Parties> : <Message> >> S -> A : {B Na *Kab tb}Kas {A *Kab tb}Kbs Nb
Encrypt term(s) < B Na *Kab tb > with key Kas is readable by both sender/receiver.
The unencrypted/fresh nonce Na has been received back in new component: {B Na Kab tb}Kas
Incoming test for A because fresh term Na was sent out earlier in < Na >
Unsolicited test for A because of nonce Kab within test component < {B Na Kab tb}Kas >
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Kab in encrypted form.
Unsolicited test for A because of nonce tb within test component < {B Na Kab tb}Kas >
Encrypted term(s) < A *Kab tb > with key Kbs is readable by sender only.
Warning: Sender is transmitting nonce Kab in two separate components, invalidating its use as an
outgoing test.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting an invalid Kab in encrypted
form.
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : {A *Kab tb}Kbs {Nb}Kab
Encrypted term(s) < A *Kab tb > with key Kbs is readable by recipient only.
Unsolicited test for B because of nonce Kab within test component < {A Kab tb}Kbs >
The encrypted/fresh nonce tb has been received back in new component: {A Kab tb}Kbs
Outgoing/Incoming test for B because fresh term tb was sent out earlier in < {A Na tb}Kbs >
Encrypt term(s) < Nb > with key Kab is readable by both sender/receiver.
The unencrypted/fresh nonce Nb has been received back in new component: {Nb}Kab
Incoming test for B because fresh term Nb was sent out earlier in < Nb >

Figure 4.4 – Neuman-Stubblebine with Tags on Keys/Tickets
In Figure 4.5, the Neuman-Stubblebine is run on the SPA without attaching the * to
the keys or ticket. The only difference here is that it follows more closely with the results
made by Guttman [5]. However, it is not incorrect to show a key or timestamp, generated
similarly to a nonce, as fresh and denoting it with a fresh identifier as previously shown.
Nor does it negate the conclusion of the previous example.
A -> B : A *Na1
B -> S : B {A *Na1 Tb}Kbs *Nb1
S -> A : {B Na1 Kab Tb}Kas {A Kab Tb}Kbs Nb1
A -> B : {A Kab Tb}Kbs {Nb1}Kab
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<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : A *Na1
Sender may be attempting to initiate an incoming test by transmitting Na1 in the clear.
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> S : B {A *Na1 Tb}Kbs *Nb1
Encrypt term(s) < A *Na1 Tb > with key Kbs is readable by both sender/receiver.
Sender is attempting to intiate a test with an old/invalidated nonce!
Unsolicited test for S because of nonce Na1 within test component < {A Na1 Tb}Kbs >
Sender may be attempting to initiate an incoming test by transmitting Nb1 in the clear.
<Parties> : <Message> >> S -> A : {B Na1 Kab Tb}Kas {A Kab Tb}Kbs Nb1
Encrypt term(s) < B Na1 Kab Tb > with key Kas is readable by both sender/receiver.
The unencrypted/fresh nonce Na1 has been received back in new component: {B Na1 Kab Tb}Kas
Incoming test for A because fresh term Na1 was sent out earlier in < Na1 >
Encrypted term(s) < A Kab Tb > with key Kbs is readable by sender only.
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : {A Kab Tb}Kbs {Nb1}Kab
Encrypted term(s) < A Kab Tb > with key Kbs is readable by recipient only.
Encrypt term(s) < Nb1 > with key Kab is readable by both sender/receiver.
The unencrypted/fresh nonce Nb1 has been received back in new component: {Nb1}Kab
Incoming test for B because fresh term Nb1 was sent out earlier in < Nb1 >

Figure 4.5 – Neuman-Stubblebine w/o Tags on Keys/Tickets
4.2.5 Needham-Schroeder with Server
In this test, the Needham-Schroeder protocol is executed on the SPA again. However,
unlike before, the server portion of the protocol is included (Figure 4.6). This protocol is
drawn directly from [29]. However, for clarification, the keys Kas and Kbs are used to
show when the server is communicating with A and B specifically. Normal operation of
the protocol entails the server using its private key for encryption of these messages and
assumes both parties have the servers’ public key. The use of this key format does not
alter the results of the test.
A -> S : A B
S -> A : {Kb B}KaS
A -> B : {A *Na}Kb
B -> S : B A
S -> B : {Ka A}KbS
B -> A : {Na *Nb}Ka
A -> B : {Nb}Kb
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<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> S : A B
<Parties> : <Message> >> S -> A : {Kb B}KaS
Encrypt term(s) < Kb B > with key KaS is readable by both sender/receiver.

<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : {A *Na}Kb
Encrypted term(s) < A *Na > with key Kb is readable by recipient only.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Na in encrypted form.
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> S : B A
<Parties> : <Message> >> S -> B : {Ka A}KbS
Encrypt term(s) < Ka A > with key KbS is readable by both sender/receiver.
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> A : {Na *Nb}Ka
Encrypted term(s) < Na *Nb > with key Ka is readable by recipient only.
The encrypted/fresh nonce Na has been received back in new component: {Na Nb}Ka
Outgoing test for A because fresh term Na was sent out earlier in < {A Na}Kb >
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Nb in encrypted form.
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : {Nb}Kb
Encrypted term(s) < Nb > with key Kb is readable by recipient only.
The encrypted/fresh nonce Nb has been received back in new component: {Nb}Kb
Outgoing test for B because fresh term Nb was sent out earlier in < {Na Nb}Ka > >

Figure 4.6 – Needham-Schroeder Protocol (w/ Server)
This test results in output similar to earlier tests with Needham-Schroeder. The only
real difference is the interaction with the server that occurs between each party.
4.2.6 Kerberos Protocol
The Kerberos protocol results are very similar to Neuman-Stubblebine. In Chapter 2,
an in-depth description of how this protocol works is given. The layout used here, which
contains more specific information in each message, is taken directly from [29].
Regarding the analysis, there are no surprises in the output. The only subjective action
was not to tag all keys and timestamps as fresh, even though they are. The reason is that,
based on the Neuman-Stubblebine output, nothing further would be gained from this
except a more lengthy output.
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C -> A : U G L1 *N1
A -> C : U {U C G *Kcg Tst Tex}Kag {G *Kcg Tst Tex N1}Ku
C -> G : S L2 *N2 {U C G *Kcg Tst Tex}Kag {C *T1}Kcg
G -> C : U {U C S *Kcs Tst1 Tex1}Kcg {S *Kcs Tst1 Tex1 N2}Kcg
C -> S : {U C S Kcs Tst1 Tex1}Kcg {C *T2}Kcs
S -> C : {T2}Kcs
<Parties> : <Message> >> C -> A : U G L1 *N1
Sender may be attempting to initiate an incoming test by transmitting N1 in the clear.
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> C : U {U C G *Kcg Tst Tex}Kag {G *Kcg Tst Tex N1}Ku
Encrypted term(s) < U C G *Kcg Tst Tex > with key Kag is readable by sender only.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Kcg in encrypted form.
Encrypted term(s) < G *Kcg Tst Tex N1 > with key Ku is readable by neither sender nor receiver.
Warning: Sender is transmitting nonce Kcg in two separate components, invalidating its use as an
outgoing test.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting an invalid Kcg in encrypted
form.
<Parties> : <Message> >> C -> G : S L2 *N2 {U C G *Kcg Tst Tex}Kag {C *T1}Kcg
Sender may be attempting to initiate an incoming test by transmitting N2 in the clear.
Encrypted term(s) < U C G *Kcg Tst Tex > with key Kag is readable by recipient only.
Unsolicited test for G because of nonce Kcg within test component < {U C G Kcg Tst Tex}Kag >
Encrypt term(s) < C *T1 > with key Kcg is readable by both sender/receiver.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting T1 in encrypted form.
Unsolicited test for G because of nonce T1 within test component < {C T1}Kcg >
<Parties> : <Message> >> G -> C : U {U C S *Kcs Tst1 Tex1}Kcg {S *Kcs Tst1 Tex1 N2}Kcg
Encrypt term(s) < U C S *Kcs Tst1 Tex1 > with key Kcg is readable by both sender/receiver.
Pseudo-unsolicited test for C because Kcs is a newly received fresh nonce, but C has sent items to G
previously.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Kcs in encrypted form.
Encrypt term(s) < S *Kcs Tst1 Tex1 N2 > with key Kcg is readable by both sender/receiver.
Warning: C is seeing Kcs again...but it's tagged with * (fresh) identifier!
Warning: Sender is transmitting nonce Kcs in two separate components, invalidating its use as an
outgoing test.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting an invalid Kcs in encrypted
form.
The unencrypted/fresh nonce N2 has been received back in new component: {S Kcs Tst1 Tex1
N2}Kcg
Incoming test for C because fresh term N2 was sent out earlier in < N2 >
<Parties> : <Message> >> C -> S : {U C S Kcs Tst1 Tex1}Kcg {C *T2}Kcs
Encrypted term(s) < U C S Kcs Tst1 Tex1 > with key Kcg is readable by sender only.
Encrypt term(s) < C *T2 > with key Kcs is readable by both sender/receiver.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting T2 in encrypted form.
Unsolicited test for S because of nonce T2 within test component < {C T2}Kcs >
<Parties> : <Message> >> S -> C : {T2}Kcs
Encrypt term(s) < T2 > with key Kcs is readable by both sender/receiver.
The encrypted/fresh nonce T2 has been received back in new component: {T2}Kcs
Outgoing/Incoming test for C because fresh term T2 was sent out earlier in < {C T2}Kcs >
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Figure 4.7 – Kerberos Protocol
4.2.7 Analyzing Otway-Rees
In this section, the Otway-Rees protocol is analyzed using the SPA. Figure 4.8 shows
the output generated from the SPA.
A -> B : *M A B {*Na1 *M A B}Kas
B -> S : M A B {Na1 M A B}Kas {*Nb1 M A B}Kbs
S -> B : M {Na1 *Kab}Kas {Nb1 *Kab}Kbs
B -> A : M {Na1 Kab}Kas
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : *M A B {*Na1 *M A B}Kas
Sender may be attempting to initiate an incoming test by transmitting M in the clear.
Encrypted term(s) < *Na1 *M A B > with key Kas is readable by sender only.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Na1 in encrypted form.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting M in encrypted form.
Sender is sending the same nonce M out both encrypted and plain.
It may only be used to complete an incoming test.
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> S : M A B {Na1 M A B}Kas {*Nb1 M A B}Kbs
Encrypted term(s) < Na1 M A B > with key Kas is readable by recipient only.
Unsolicited test for S because of nonce Na1 within test component < {Na1 M A B}Kas >
Unsolicited test for S because of nonce M within test component < {Na1 M A B}Kas >
Encrypt term(s) < *Nb1 M A B > with key Kbs is readable by both sender/receiver.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Nb1 in encrypted form.
Unsolicited test for S because of nonce Nb1 within test component < {Nb1 M A B}Kbs >
<Parties> : <Message> >> S -> B : M {Na1 *Kab}Kas {Nb1 *Kab}Kbs
Encrypted term(s) < Na1 *Kab > with key Kas is readable by sender only.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Kab in encrypted form.
Encrypt term(s) < Nb1 *Kab > with key Kbs is readable by both sender/receiver.
The encrypted/fresh nonce Nb1 has been received back in new component: {Nb1 Kab}Kbs
Outgoing/Incoming test for B because fresh term Nb1 was sent out earlier in < {Nb1 M A B}Kbs >
Pseudo-unsolicited test for B because Kab is a newly received fresh nonce, but B has sent items to S
previously.
Warning: Sender is transmitting nonce Kab in two separate components, invalidating its use as an
outgoing test.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting an invalid Kab in encrypted
form.
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> A : M {Na1 Kab}Kas
Encrypted term(s) < Na1 Kab > with key Kas is readable by recipient only.
The encrypted/fresh nonce Na1 has been received back in new component: {Na1 Kab}Kas
Outgoing/Incoming test for A because fresh term Na1 was sent out earlier in < {Na1 M A B}Kas >
Unsolicited test for A because of nonce Kab within test component < {Na1 Kab}Kas >
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Figure 4.8 – Output of Otway-Rees protocol run
In the Otway-Rees run there is nothing new being seen by the analyzer that has not
already been demonstrated. The only important thing to get from this is that the SPA is
capable of accurately finding authentication tests and examples of basic
mischievous/erroneous activity.
4.3 Non-Regular Protocol Test Cases
This section examines several test cases meant to test the reliability of the SPA against
cases that, although not representative of any real protocol, may undoubtedly surface in a
similar form. These test cases are essentially designed to test the analyzers ability to
recognize common mischievous activities as defined in the Dolev-Yao threat model.
4.3.1 Repeating Message
This section examines how the SPA can verify a case in which a principal retransmits
an identical message back to the sender. In Figure 4.9, principal A transmits a test
component containing a fresh nonce. From a receiver’s point of view, this constitutes an
unsolicited test. However, the intended recipient simply retransmits the message back to
the sender. Because the component received back is not altered, A cannot deduce that an
intended party performed any action on the component; therefore, this does not constitute
an outgoing test.
A -> B : {*Na}Kab
B -> A : {Na}Kab
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : {*Na}Kab
Encrypt term(s) < *Na > with key Kab is readable by both sender/receiver.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Na in encrypted form.
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Unsolicited test for B because of nonce Na within test component < {Na}Kab >
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> A : {Na}Kab
Encrypt term(s) < Na > with key Kab is readable by both sender/receiver.
The encrypted nonce Na has been received back, but in a duplicated transmission!
The component {Na}Kab was sent out identically by this sender.

Figure 4.9 - Repeating Message
4.3.2 Sub Term Relationship of Encrypted Test Component
This section covers a test that demonstrates the analyzers ability to verify usage of test
components as a whole in an improper manner. Recall from Chapter 2 that the definition
of a test component stipulates that a test component cannot exist as a proper subterm of
any other term on any other regular node. In this example, B attempts to use A’s
encrypted message as his own ‘fresh’ term when communicating with C. The analyzer,
which looks ahead, realizes this and flags the original component as invalid! Because of
this, A is no longer able to complete is outgoing test. Since we are using asymmetric
cryptography, no unsolicited tests occur either. The only test that might have occurred in
this run would be an outgoing if C gets his fresh nonce back at a later time.
A -> B : {*Na}Kb
B -> C : {{Na}Kb}Kc
C -> B : {{Na}Kb *Nc}Kb
B -> A : {Na Nc}Ka
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : {*Na}Kb
Encrypted term(s) < *Na > with key Kb is readable by recipient only.
{Na}Kb is an invalid test component because it's either a proper
subterm of another component or is a duplicate transmission!
Receiver is receiving an invalid test component {Na}Kb otherwise, it would be an unsolicited test
with fresh term Na
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> C : {{Na}Kb}Kc
Encrypted term(s) < {Na}Kb > with key Kc is readable by recipient only.
Encrypted term(s) < Na > with key Kb is readable by sender only.
<Parties> : <Message> >> C -> B : {{Na}Kb *Nc}Kb
Encrypted term(s) < {Na}Kb *Nc > with key Kb is readable by recipient only.
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Encrypted term(s) < Na > with key Kb is readable by recipient only.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Nc in encrypted form.
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> A : {Na Nc}Ka
Encrypted term(s) < Na Nc > with key Ka is readable by recipient only.

Figure 4.10 - Sub-Term Re-Encryption
4.3.3 Unreadable Encryption on Messages
The final improper protocol test involves testing the SPA’s ability to check for proper
encryption. In Figure 4.11, the SPA is running the Needham-Schroeder protocol but on
line two of the input file, the encryption ensures A cannot read the message. Therefore,
the SPA should not show any example of an outgoing test. Correctly so, the SPA does
not. In fact, notice the SPA’s ability to demonstrate duplicate transmission of messages.
A -> B : {*Na}Kb
B -> A : {Na *Nb}Kb
A -> B : {Na Nb}Kb
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : {*Na}Kb
Encrypted term(s) < *Na > with key Kb is readable by recipient only.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Na in encrypted form.
<Parties> : <Message> >> B -> A : {Na *Nb}Kb
Encrypted term(s) < Na *Nb > with key Kb is readable by sender only.
Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Nb in encrypted form.
<Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : {Na Nb}Kb
Encrypted term(s) < Na Nb > with key Kb is readable by recipient only.
The encrypted nonce Nb has been received back, but in a duplicated transmission!
The component {Na Nb}Kb was sent out identically by this sender.

Figure 4.11 – Needham-Schroeder with improper encryption
4.4 Summary
This chapter described the results of running several normal protocols and several
incorrect protocols on the SPA. The output of each test is described in detail in order for
the reader to have a greater appreciation of what the tool is doing. It is evident that the
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tool provides a reliable means of determining if and where any authentication tests occur
in the occurrence of a particular protocol. The SPA also demonstrates its ability to
ascertain improper behavior, as demonstrated in the ‘improper’ protocols. Although the
SPA is not designed to show weaknesses in a protocol, the absence of authentication tests
should raise flags regarding a protocol and thus increase skepticism regarding its security.
The next chapter gives final analysis of the results of running the SPA on communication
protocols.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter provides conclusions as to the success of the research and provides a
roadmap for future work in the field of protocol analysis. It provides insight into what
the Secure Protocol Analyzer accomplishes and how another modeling language may or
may not provide better analysis of protocols in the future.
5.1 Conclusions of Research
The SPA successfully shows that protocol analysis with a tool developed in Java
is highly valuable in the performance of protocol analysis. In particular, the SPA is able
to determine when and where outgoing, incoming and unsolicited tests occur within a
protocol run. Using string comparisons vice type comparisons requires specific values be
given and does limit the application to analysis based on completed static runs. However,
putting together numerous protocols in generic text files proves much easier than
individual protocol development as noted in other protocol analyzers [27, 11]. It also
allows for much quicker analysis of the protocol because it does not have to dynamically
create a search tree, instead it only examines the post-run state of the protocol as entered
in the input text file. In conclusion, the SPA allows the taking of any protocol as input in
a standard text file and generates accurate output that shows occurrences of
authentication tests, and it does so very quickly.
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5.3 Significance of Research
This research is significant because it creates a simple-to-use tool that effectively
shows the presence of authentication tests. Although there are numerous other methods
for analyzing protocols, this method proves easy to use, accurate in its results and, more
importantly, it enables any protocol to be entered in with minimal effort by the user.
Another important result of this work is that output from the SPA can be tailored to one’s
unique work. This opens the possibility that output from the SPA could be used as input
for other theorem checking tools or protocol analysis tools that may look for different
aspects regarding a particular protocol. Finally, this fast automation of analysis is
important because the longer a protocol is left in use without in-depth analysis being
performed on it, the more the chance of mischievous persons finding a potential
weakness during its use and exploiting it.
5.4 Recommendations for Future Research
Although the tool is fairly complete in its present form, added functionality will
certainly improve the effectiveness of the tool. For example, adding functionality that
would include provisions for penetrator capabilities. This would entail adding in a means
to examine static runs and evaluate what information a penetrator is able to derive based
on the Dolev-Yao threat model. From this information, the tool might be able to start
developing its own messages in an effort to show the user that it is possible to implant
false messages leading to potential havoc on the principals. Another function worth
adding is that of showing all the keys used during the protocol exchange. From this, the
analyzer can show the keys actually used for encryption, whether they are safe or not,
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then show the set assumed to be safe as defined by Guttman. Also, as stated in [5], since
the authentication tests work even if n and n' are on different strands, add to the analyzer
the ability to find the tests within different strands.
Another course of action is development in another modeling language altogether.
Using an analyzer developed through a model checker would allow dynamic creation of
search trees where numerous different states can be analyzed showing not only where and
when authentication tests occur but also how to better develop the protocol to ensure the
authentication tests do occur and that certain states are never reached.
The other main recommendation for future research is to produce a similar analyzer
using the Maude language specifically. As stated earlier, dynamic evaluation of
protocols allows users to see first-hand the actual operation of a protocol run, versus the
after effect of the run as entered in static format. As explained in Chapter 2, Maude’s
rewriting ability would enable it to generate dynamic states very easily. With this
dynamic evaluation, using a Dolev-Yao threat model, also built into the modeling
language, the user can ascertain all the possible states that a protocol can be in and all the
possible information that can be derived. This includes states that the protocol should not
necessarily be in. Limitations would have to be placed on this method to ensure that state
space explosion and other problems do not occur as described in greater detail in Chapter
2.
Although there are numerous other protocol analyzers [11, 12, 24], none seem to
exhibit the all-knowing power to ascertain whether protocols are susceptible to attack.
However, built upon the foundation of a solid, powerful and easy to use tool the research
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and tool generated here gives analysts a clear roadmap into the future of protocol
analysis.
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Appendix A – Security Protocol Analyzer Code
/*
* Parser.java
*
* Created on December 8, 2003
*/
package protocolB.Parser;
import java.io.*;
import java.text.*;
import protocolB.*;
/**
* This class parses text from a Reader into a Protocol.
* @author rgraham
*/
public class Parser
{
/** Creates a new instance of Parser */
public Parser(Reader in) {
this.in = in;
}
/** The lexical analyzer,
Reader. */
private Token nextToken()
StringBuffer sb = new
int type;
int ch;
// It

which returns the next token from the
throws ParseException {
StringBuffer();
is so annoying that read returns int!

if (nextToken != null)
return nextToken;
// Get the next input character
ch = getChar();
// Skip white space
while (ch == ' ' || ch == '\t' || ch == '\r')
ch = getChar();
// Read until one complete token is found
if (ch == -1)
type = Token.EOF;
else if (ch == '\n')
type = Token.EOL;
else if (ch == '{')
type = Token.LBRACE;
else if (ch == '}')
type = Token.RBRACE;
else if (ch == ':')
type = Token.COLON;
else if (ch == '*')
type = Token.STAR;
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else if (ch == '-') {
getChar();
// Skip '>' without checking it
type = Token.ARROW;
}
else if (Character.isLetterOrDigit((char) ch)) {
do {
sb.append((char) ch);
ch = getChar();
} while (Character.isLetterOrDigit((char) ch));
prev = ch;
type = Token.IDENTIFIER;
}
else
throw new ParseException("Unrecognized character '" + ch +
"'", offset);
nextToken = new Token(type, sb.toString());
return nextToken;
}
/** Reads the next logical character from the input, which may be
the
* readahead character.
*/
private int getChar() {
int ch = -1;
if (prev != 0) {
ch = prev;
prev = 0;
}
else {
try {
ch = in.read();
} catch (Exception e) {
System.err.println(e);
System.err.println("Aborting.");
System.exit(1);
}
offset++;
}
return ch;
}
public Protocol parse() throws ParseException {
Protocol p = new Protocol();
Message m;
while (nextToken().getType() != Token.EOF) {
try {
m = parseMessage();
p.addMessage(m);
} catch (ParseException e) {
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System.err.println(e + " at offset " +
e.getErrorOffset());
// Skip tokens until EOL or EOF
while (nextToken().getType() != Token.EOL
&& nextToken().getType() != Token.EOF)
nextToken = null;
}
}
Match(Token.EOF);
return p;
}
/** Matches a specified token type against the next input token and
throws an
* exception if it doesn't match.
*/
protected Token Match(int t) throws ParseException {
Token next = nextToken();
if (next.getType() != t)
throw new ParseException("Match Bad token " +
Token.names[next.getType()]
+ ", expected " + Token.names[t],
offset);
nextToken = null; // Consume the token
return next;
}
protected Encryption parseEncryption() throws ParseException {
Term m;
Text key;
Match(Token.LBRACE);
m = parseTerm();
Match(Token.RBRACE);
key = parseText();
return new Encryption(m, key);
}
protected Text parseText() throws ParseException {
boolean fresh = false;
Token next = nextToken();
if (next.getType() == Token.STAR) {
fresh = true;
Match(Token.STAR);
}
Token id = Match(Token.IDENTIFIER);
return new Text(id.getText(), fresh);
}
protected Message parseMessage() throws ParseException {
Text from, to;
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Term m;
from = parseText();
Match(Token.ARROW);
to = parseText();
Match(Token.COLON);
m = parseTerm();
Match(Token.EOL);
return new Message(from.getText(), to.getText(), m);
}
/** Parses a sequence of one or more Terms. If more than one, it
returns
* a Sequence containing the Terms found.
*/
public Term parseTerm() throws ParseException {
Term term = null, nextTerm;
Token next = nextToken();
while (next.getType() != Token.RBRACE && next.getType() !=
Token.EOL
&& next.getType() != Token.EOF) {
if (next.getType() == Token.LBRACE)
nextTerm = parseEncryption();
else if (next.getType() == Token.IDENTIFIER
|| next.getType() == Token.STAR)
nextTerm = parseText();
else
throw new ParseException("Unexpected token "
+ Token.names[next.getType()]
+ ", expected LBRACE,
IDENTIFIER or STAR",
offset);
if (term == null)
term = nextTerm;
else if (term instanceof Sequence)
((Sequence) term).addTerm(nextTerm);
else {
Sequence temp = new Sequence();
temp.addTerm(term);
temp.addTerm(nextTerm);
term = temp;
}
next = nextToken();
}
if (term == null)
throw new ParseException("Term expected", offset);
return term;
}
protected Reader in;
private int prev = 0;

// Lookahead character
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private Token nextToken = null;
private int offset = 0;

// Lookahead token

}
/*
* Token.java
*
* Created on December 8, 2003
*/
package protocolB.Parser;
/**
* This class represents a single Token parsed from an input stream.
*
* @author rgraham
*/
public class Token {
/** Creates a new instance of Token */
public Token(int type, String text) {
this.type = type;
this.text = text;
}
public int getType() {
return type;
}
public String getText() {
return text;
}
public
public
public
public
public
public
public
public

static
static
static
static
static
static
static
static

final
final
final
final
final
final
final
final

int
int
int
int
int
int
int
int

EOF = 0;
LBRACE = 1;
RBRACE = 2;
IDENTIFIER = 3;
ARROW = 4;
COLON = 5;
EOL = 6;
STAR = 7;

public static String names[] = { "EOF", "LBRACE", "RBRACE",
"IDENTIFIER",
"ARROW", "COLON", "EOL", "STAR" };
protected int type;
protected String text;
}
package protocolB;
/**
* Stephen Mancini and Robert Graham
* AFIT/ENG
* 24 Feb 2004
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This is just the abstract class that encryption, sequence and term are
extending
*/
import java.util.*;
public abstract class Term
{
public Term()
{ }
public abstract void getReadableTexts(String lfrom, String lto,
Vector p,
boolean readable, boolean sent_plain, String comp,
Vector list_of_components, Vector old_sent, Vector bad_test_comp,
Vector temp_holdings, Vector text_obj, String type_enc);
//IF there is a better way to do this I just don't kow how right
now...but at
//least I haven't reached 13 arguments, 12 means perfection -> 13
means insanity!!!
public abstract void getComp(Vector bad_test_comp,Vector
temp_holdings, String lfrom, String lto, boolean outside);//Go through
tree and get {h}k
public abstract void getTextObj(Vector text_obj);
}
package protocolB;
/**
* Stephen Mancini and Robert Graham
* AFIT/ENG
* 24 Feb 2004
RGraham says:
* A Text is a primitive (atomic) Term. Common texts are principal
names, keys
* and nonces. A fresh text is one that is generated dynamically in
such a way
* as to be unique among all other texts in use (at least to high
probability,
* as by a pseudo-random process with a sufficient text length).
*
What more can I say? However, these is where principal.addnonce is
called for each individual instance of a term.
It then goes into that particular parties instance and checks their
vectors to see if it is completing a test
*/
import java.util.*;
public class Text extends Term
{
/** Creates a new instance of Text */
public Text(String text, boolean fresh) {
this.text = text;
this.fresh = fresh;
if (fresh) this.wasfresh = true; //if it is fresh it will have
once been fresh
//this wasfresh should never change because it only says the
term was fresh at one time
}
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public String getText() {
return text;
}
public boolean isFresh() {
return fresh;
}
public void getReadableTexts(String lfrom, String lto, Vector p,
boolean readable, boolean sent_plain, String comp,
Vector list_of_components, Vector
old_sent, Vector bad_test_comp, Vector temp_holdings, Vector text_obj,
String type_enc)
{
int y = 0;
if (this.isFresh())
{
while (y < p.size())
{
Principal P = (Principal) p.elementAt(y);
if (P.lname.equalsIgnoreCase(lfrom))
P.addnonce(text, "sender", lfrom, lto, readable,
sent_plain, true, comp, list_of_components, old_sent, bad_test_comp,
temp_holdings, text_obj, type_enc);
if (P.lname.equalsIgnoreCase(lto))
P.addnonce(text, "receiver", lfrom, lto, readable,
sent_plain, true, comp, list_of_components, old_sent,
bad_test_comp,temp_holdings, text_obj, type_enc);
y++;
}
}//End of if it's fresh
else//Even if it's not fresh, if it was fresh the text_obj vector
has each text object in it, that way I can get more about this
particular text
{
int U = 0;
String temp = "";
while (U < p.size())
{
Principal P = (Principal) p.elementAt(U);
if (P.lname.equalsIgnoreCase(lto))//lto (below) used to be
temp, not sure why?should have used comments earlier!
P.addnonce(text, "receiver", lfrom, lto, readable,
sent_plain, false, comp, list_of_components, old_sent, bad_test_comp,
temp_holdings, text_obj, type_enc);
U++;
}
}//End of else it's not
}
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public String toString() {
return (fresh ? "*" : "") + text;
}
public void getComp(Vector bad_test_comp, Vector temp_holdings,
String lfrom, String lto, boolean outside)//, Vector text_obj)
{
}//End of get comp
public void getTextObj(Vector text_obj)
{
//I just want my text object which is the {}K stuff, in principal
I'll check if my
//individual term is in the bad 't'
boolean toadd = false;//once I loop through vector if text is not
in there this changes to true
int t = 0;
//Then it gets added to the list, ensures
duplicates aren't added
while (t < text_obj.size())
{
Text temptext = (Text) text_obj.elementAt(t);
if (temptext.getText().equalsIgnoreCase(this.getText()))
{ toadd = true;
}
t++;
}//end of while
if (!toadd)
{ text_obj.addElement(this);
}
toadd = false;//change it back regardless...even though when I
come back it gets reset anyways!!!
}//End of getTextObj
protected
protected
protected
protected

String text;
boolean fresh;
boolean is_nonce;
boolean wasfresh;

}
package protocolB;
import java.util.*;
/**
* Stephen Mancini and Robert Graham
* AFIT/ENG
* 24 Feb 2004
* A Sequence is a concatenation of Terms. Concatenation is assumed to
be
* associative.
* This class calls getreadabletext based on type of comp it is
working with...
* @author rgraham
*/
public class Sequence extends Term
{
/** Creates a new instance of Sequence */
public Sequence() {
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terms = new ArrayList();
}
public void addTerm(Term t) {
terms.add(t);
}
public ListIterator getTerms() {
return terms.listIterator();
}
public void getComp(Vector bad_test_comp,Vector temp_holdings,
String lfrom, String lto, boolean outside)
{
System.out.println("Enter getComp in sequ");
for (ListIterator i = terms.listIterator(); i.hasNext(); )
{
Term u = (Term) i.next();
System.out.println(u.toString());
if (u instanceof Sequence)
{//Once I am inside encryption, it has its own way of handling
sequences...slightly different from sequence method
u.getComp(bad_test_comp, temp_holdings,lfrom, lto, outside);
}
else if (u instanceof Encryption)//This won't be internal
encryption, that is handled inside encrpytion
{//This is the case where the message comes in for example: A
{a}K<-then it will call encryption to check inside this
temp_holdings.addElement(u.toString());//should add outside
encryption to temp_holdings
//////////
int max = u.toString().length();
int Y = 0;
String hold = "";
while (Y < max)
{
if (!u.toString().substring(Y,
Y+1).equalsIgnoreCase("*"))
hold = hold + u.toString().substring(Y, Y+1);
Y++;
}
temp_holdings.addElement(hold);
String hold1 = hold + lfrom;
String hold2 = hold + lto;
if (!temp_holdings.contains(hold1))
if (!temp_holdings.contains(hold2))
temp_holdings.addElement(hold1);
//////////
u.getComp(bad_test_comp,temp_holdings, lfrom, lto,
outside);//Now let's go inside the encryption and check for term types
}
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else //What else could it be?//it must be text don't really
care, it does nothing anyways
u.getComp(bad_test_comp,temp_holdings, lfrom, lto,
outside);
}
}//End of get comp function
public void getTextObj(Vector text_obj)
{
for (ListIterator i = terms.listIterator(); i.hasNext(); )
{
Term u = (Term) i.next();
u.getTextObj(text_obj);//Call whatever instance of term the
i.next is
}
}
public void getReadableTexts(String lfrom, String lto, Vector p,
boolean readable,
boolean sent_plain, String comp,
Vector list_of_components,
Vector old_sent, Vector bad_test_comp,
Vector temp_holdings, Vector text_obj, String type_enc)
{
for (ListIterator i = terms.listIterator(); i.hasNext(); )
{
Term u = (Term) i.next();
if (u instanceof Sequence)//Could be more sequence of stuff
{
u.getReadableTexts(lfrom, lto, p, readable, sent_plain,
comp, list_of_components, old_sent, bad_test_comp, temp_holdings,
text_obj, type_enc); }
else if (u instanceof Encryption)
{
String temporary = u.toString();
u.getReadableTexts(lfrom, lto, p, readable, sent_plain,
temporary, list_of_components, old_sent, bad_test_comp, temp_holdings,
text_obj, type_enc);
list_of_components.addElement(temporary);
}
//Work with component then add it to "I've seen it
already" vector
else //It's either encryption or text object...
{//don't add text to component list....
u.getReadableTexts(lfrom, lto, p, readable, sent_plain, comp,
list_of_components, old_sent, bad_test_comp, temp_holdings, text_obj,
type_enc);
}//End of else it isn't sequence
}//End of for loop
}//End of GetReadable Texts() function
public String toString() {
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StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer();
for (ListIterator i = terms.listIterator(); i.hasNext(); ) {
sb.append(((Term) i.next()).toString());
if (i.hasNext())
sb.append(" ");
}
return sb.toString();
}
protected List terms;
}
package protocolB;
/**
* Stephen Mancini and Robert Graham
* AFIT/ENG
* 23 Feb 2004
This is where the main() function is. This is the driver of the
program! Here is where the following occurs:
individual instances of principal are created from the 'from' and 'to'
of the message, they are placed in a vector
and passed around. Also, each message is broken into components and
analyzed if it's a duplicate or subterm (subterm
verification also is checked in encryption class). Depending on check,
the comp is placed in wither test_comp vector
or bad_comp vector.
After this steps are done, it then starts the
process by analyzing 1 message at a time, depending
on what the instance is, it call getreadabletext. Since a message may
contain sub-parts, getreadabletext is also called
recursively in other classes such as encryption and text.
*/
//import Parser.*;
import protocolB.Parser.*;
import java.io.*;
import java.util.*;
import java.text.ParseException;
public class ProtocolAnalyzer {
public static void main(String[] args) {
boolean err = false;
Protocol protocol = null;
Reader reader = null;
Vector
Vector
Vector
componentsfu
Vector

num_parties = new Vector();
parties = new Vector();
list_of_components = new Vector(); //Lists all
old_sent = new Vector();

Vector bad_test_comp = new Vector(); //this one only worries
about
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//whether some t = {h}k is not a proper subcomponent of any
regular node
Vector temp_holdings = new Vector();//This started out as a
temp item but now has evolved into a real vector to be used
//it contains the encrypted terms that can act as legitimate
test components...
Vector text_obj = new Vector(); //Make an instance of each text
and pass it around
//The wonderful world of non-GUI main screens
System.out.println();
System.out.println(">>>>>>>>>>>>>> Protocol-Analyzer Version
1.2 <<<<<<<<<<<<<");
if (args.length == 0) {
System.out.println("Nothing to parse.");
System.exit(1);
}
System.out.println("Parsing from file '" + args[0] + "'");
try {
reader = new FileReader(args[0]);
} catch (Exception e) {
System.out.println(e);
System.exit(1);
}
Parser p = new Parser(reader);
try {
protocol = p.parse();
} catch (ParseException e) {
System.out.println(e + " at offset " + e.getErrorOffset());
err = true;
} catch (Exception e) {
System.out.println(e);
err = true;
}
if (!err)
System.out.println("File Contents:\n" + protocol);
for (ListIterator i = protocol.listIterator(); i.hasNext(); )
{
Message t = (Message) i.next();
//Lets count the number of unique parties in the given
protocol
if (!num_parties.contains(t.from))
num_parties.addElement(t.from);
if (!num_parties.contains(t.to))
num_parties.addElement(t.to);
}//End of for loop which creates principal instances...
//Start creating instances of party for each player in the
protocol
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String temp = "";
int j = 0;
while (j<num_parties.size())
{
temp = num_parties.elementAt(j).toString();
Principal PPP = new Principal(temp);
parties.addElement(PPP);
temp = "";
j++;
}
///////////This section will run through the whole protocol and get all
components for
///////////later testing on subterm relationships...
///////////Will also do the text_obj stuff in here
for (ListIterator i = protocol.listIterator(); i.hasNext(); )
{
Message t = (Message) i.next();
Term g = (Term) t.getTerm();
if (g instanceof Sequence)
{
Sequence S = (Sequence) g;
for (ListIterator k = S.getTerms(); k.hasNext();)
{
Term l = (Term) k.next();
l.getComp(bad_test_comp, temp_holdings, t.from, t.to,
true);
l.getTextObj(text_obj);
}//End of for loop within sequence
}//End of if statement
else if (g instanceof Encryption)
{
temp_holdings.addElement(g);
//This part makes copy and puts it in without * so I can
check for duplicate later
int max = g.toString().length();
int Y = 0;
String hold = "";
while (Y < max)
{
if (!g.toString().substring(Y,
Y+1).equalsIgnoreCase("*"))
hold = hold + g.toString().substring(Y, Y+1);
Y++;
}
temp_holdings.addElement(hold);
String hold1 = hold + t.from;
String hold2 = hold + t.to;
if (!temp_holdings.contains(hold1))
if (!temp_holdings.contains(hold2))
temp_holdings.addElement(hold1);
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g.getComp(bad_test_comp, temp_holdings, t.from, t.to,
true);
g.getTextObj(text_obj);
}
else if (g instanceof Text)
{
g.getComp(bad_test_comp, temp_holdings, t.from, t.to,
true);
g.getTextObj(text_obj);
}
}//End of for loop through evaluation of entire protocol for
potential test components
//What this part does is take the terms in my array of suspect
comp's and remove *, so that
//someone doesn't retransmit exact same message back
//for example: {*N}Kmn then resend as {N}Kmn is not valid
outoging test!
/*
int h = 0;
int max = bad_test_comp.size();
String holder = "";
String temporary2 = "";
while (h < max)
{
holder = bad_test_comp.elementAt(h).toString();
int y = 0;
while (y <holder.length())
{
if (!holder.substring(y,y+1).equalsIgnoreCase("*"))
temporary2 = temporary2 + holder.substring(y,y+1);
y++;
}//End of innner while
bad_test_comp.addElement(temporary2);
temporary2 = "";
h++;
}//End of outer while*/

/*

//Take out the * in the temp holding vector
int h = 0;
int max = temp_holdings.size();
String holder = "";
String temporary2 = "";
while (h < max)
{
holder = temp_holdings.elementAt(h).toString();
int y = 0;
while (y <holder.length())
{
if (!holder.substring(y,y+1).equalsIgnoreCase("*"))
temporary2 = temporary2 + holder.substring(y,y+1);
y++;
}//End of innner while
temp_holdings.addElement(temporary2);
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temporary2 = "";
h++;
}//End of outer while*/
///MORE DEBUG CODE JUST DUMPS VECTORS OF COMP DEBUG CODE///
/*
int K = 0;
while (K < bad_test_comp.size())
{//This is for testing purposes
System.out.println("Bad test comp: " +
bad_test_comp.elementAt(K).toString());
K++;
}
K = 0;
while (K < temp_holdings.size())
{//This is for testing purposes
System.out.println("Temp holdings: " +
temp_holdings.elementAt(K).toString());
K++;
}*/
//DEBUG CODE DEBUG CODE //Test the text_obj vector //DEBUG CODE
/*
int w = 0;
while (w < text_obj.size())
{
Text temptext = (Text) text_obj.elementAt(w);
System.out.println("The PA output in vector is: " +
temptext.toString());
w++;
}//end of while*/
////////////End of my latest monster code which follows well that of
the pasta class! Still,
////////////it is quite ingenious....or I must be losing it, or I am a
genious...only voice number 3
////////////in my head knows the truth :-)
for (ListIterator i = protocol.listIterator(); i.hasNext(); )
{
Message t = (Message) i.next();
System.out.println();
System.out.println("<Parties> : <Message> >> " +
t.toString());
Term g = (Term) t.getTerm();
String type_enc = "ASYM";
if (g instanceof Sequence)
{
Sequence S = (Sequence) g;
for (ListIterator k = S.getTerms(); k.hasNext();)
{
Term l = (Term) k.next();
l.getReadableTexts(t.from, t.to, parties, false, true,
l.toString(), list_of_components, old_sent, bad_test_comp,
temp_holdings, text_obj, type_enc);
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}
}
else if (g instanceof Encryption)
{
g.getReadableTexts(t.from, t.to, parties, false, true,
g.toString(), list_of_components, old_sent, bad_test_comp,
temp_holdings, text_obj, type_enc);
list_of_components.addElement(g.toString());//Work with
component then add it to "I've seen it already" vector
}
else
{
g.getReadableTexts(t.from, t.to, parties, false, true,
g.toString(), list_of_components, old_sent, bad_test_comp,
temp_holdings, text_obj, type_enc);
}//Don't add plain text to comp vector
}
}//End of main
}//End of class
package protocolB;
/**
* Stephen Mancini and Robert Graham
* AFIT/ENG
* 23 Feb 2004
This is a key class. Here is where an addnonce, that is called from
text class, ends up. This has
numerous flags and variables passed in. This class does the test for
tests. Whenever the string value
is set to sender, values sent in apply to that particular instance of
sender, created in protocolanalyzer class.
Likewise for receiver. Not much else to say on this class except that
tests work basically like this: Whenever I
am in sender mode, whatever nonce is passed in is placed in a vector
(sent_nonces if encr/sent_unencrypted is sent unencr)
As long as the comp isn't disqualified, that is. These flags are
checked mostly in all the if's of the receiver.
Then whenever I am receiver, I check through my sent_nonce and
sent_unencerypted vectors and see if the nonce passed
in is there, if so it completes whatever test is applicable.
*/
import java.util.*;
public class Principal
{
String lname = "";
String the_fresh_nonce = "";
boolean lwasfresh = false;
Vector Sent_nonces = new Vector();
Vector old_nonces = new Vector();
Vector Sent_unencrypted = new Vector();
Vector people_I_sent_stuff_to = new Vector();
Vector messages_I_saw = new Vector();
Vector sent_message_plain = new Vector();
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Vector nonces_I_saw = new Vector();
Vector comp_I_sent = new Vector();
Text hold_text;
public Principal(String tname)
{
lname = tname;
}
public void addnonce(String nonce, String person, String from,
String lto, boolean readable, boolean sent_plain, boolean is_fresh,
String comp, Vector list_of_components, Vector old_sent,
Vector bad_test_comp, Vector temp_holdings, Vector text_obj, String
type_enc)
{//readable is set in encryption class...isfresh is set in text
class....
//sent_plain is set to ture initially, then changed in
encryption class
//from and lto only have values depending on whose key it is
String temp_comp = comp + lto;//This is how I set the string
to look for duplicate retransmission of messages
//in other words, if I sent out lets say A sent out a comp
{a}Ka and it is concat with A so it is {a}Ka + A = {a}KaA then later I
am receiving it back
//to check for duplication I concatenate the lto,
//let's say it is A getting it back, so then it becomes
{a}KaA, well they match so obviously someone sent A's original comp
back <-that's bad!
//This part goes and get's the object of the nonce and then
we can ascertain it's current status (fresh or was fresh)
//that way if I want to add more info about a text object, I
can and it's real easy to get now!
//Maybe I can add a value that says who the originator was,
then I can populate that value here locally
//and then based on lfrom and lto I can decide more
accurately about the tests? FUTURE WORK!
int U = 0;
while (U < text_obj.size())
{
Text temptext = (Text) text_obj.elementAt(U);
if (nonce.equalsIgnoreCase(temptext.getText()))
{//Could populate any variable I want here that the
particular text object might hold. (Future work?)
//or I could just stop the loop and work with temptext
hold_text = temptext; //I may need to use this object
later..in fact I will!!!
lwasfresh = temptext.wasfresh;
}//End of if and end of populating variables!
U++;
}//End of while through text objects

//Let's go ahead and take out the * in the comp because a
principal may try to resend it later after
//having read it and thus taking it's freshenss out...
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int B = 0;
String placeholder = "";
while (B < comp.length())
{
if (!comp.substring(B,B+1).equalsIgnoreCase("*"))
placeholder = placeholder + comp.substring(B,B+1);
B++;
}
comp = placeholder;
//Start the principal anaylsis from the sender's view
if (person.equals("sender"))
{
if (Sent_nonces.contains(nonce))
{
int e = Sent_nonces.indexOf(nonce);
String old_comp = (String) Sent_nonces.elementAt(e +
1);
//if (!comp.equalsIgnoreCase(old_comp))
// if (temp_holdings.contains(comp) &&
temp_holdings.contains(old_comp) && comp.equalsIgnoreCase(old_comp))
if (old_comp.indexOf(comp) > 0 | comp.indexOf(old_comp)
> 0)
{}
else
{
System.out.println("Warning: Sender is transmitting
nonce " + nonce + " in two separate components, invalidating its use as
an outgoing test.");
Sent_nonces.removeElementAt(e + 1);
Sent_nonces.removeElement(nonce);
nonce = "an invalid " + nonce;
}
}//End of if sent_plain has it and I am resending in
another comp
if (sent_plain && !nonces_I_saw.contains(nonce))
{
//since these nonces are sent plain I have to go
through vector of invalid test comp
//and see if later this nonce doesn't show up there,
thus negating it's validity
int e = 0;
System.out.println("Sender may be attempting to
initiate an incoming test by transmitting " + nonce + " in the
clear.");
sent_message_plain.addElement(nonce);
sent_message_plain.addElement(comp);
}//End of initiating incoming test
//Start of initiating outgoing test
else if ((!bad_test_comp.contains(comp) ||
!temp_holdings.contains(comp)) && !nonces_I_saw.contains(nonce))
{//If the test compopnent is in bad test comp and temp
holdings it can't be used
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if ((bad_test_comp.contains(comp) &&
temp_holdings.contains(comp)))
{ }
else
{
System.out.println("Sender may be attempting to
initiate an outgoing test by transmitting " + nonce + " in encrypted
form. ");
Sent_nonces.addElement(nonce);
Sent_nonces.addElement(comp);
}
}
///End of initiating outgoing test
else if (temp_holdings.contains(comp) &&
bad_test_comp.contains(comp))
{
System.out.println(comp + " is an invalid test
component because it's either a proper");
System.out.println("subterm of another component or is
a duplicate transmission!");
}
else if (nonces_I_saw.contains(nonce))
System.out.println("Sender is attempting to intiate a
test with an old/invalidated nonce!!!");
if (readable)
{ people_I_sent_stuff_to.addElement(lto); }//Can the
person I send it to read it?
//If the recipient can't read it then it won't count
later when checking for unsolicited
if (old_nonces.contains(nonce))//Stops reuse of nonces
and won't allow tests to work
{
int z = old_nonces.indexOf(nonce);
z = z + 1;
System.out.println("I've sent nonce " + nonce + "
out before in message " + old_nonces.elementAt(z));
Sent_nonces.removeElement(old_nonces.elementAt(z)); //Get rid of
message associated with it
Sent_nonces.removeElement(nonce);//Get rid of
previously sent out nonce
if (sent_message_plain.contains(nonce))
{
z = sent_message_plain.indexOf(nonce);
sent_message_plain.removeElementAt(z + 1);
sent_message_plain.removeElement(nonce);
}
}
if (is_fresh)//Because nonces may come in bundles only get
the fresh one for display
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{
the_fresh_nonce = nonce;
else
the_fresh_nonce = "";

}

if (!from.equalsIgnoreCase(""))
{
String temporary2 = "";
int h = 0;
while (h < comp.length())
{
if
(!comp.substring(h,h+1).equalsIgnoreCase("*"))//duplicate! See below
note:
temporary2 = temporary2 +
comp.substring(h,h+1);//duplicate, not needed but not sure top part
will stay
h++;//so not going to remove this yet!!!
}
//comp_I_sent.addElement(temporary2);//putting comp in
old vector of stuff I already sent
}
//In case the person sends out a nonce both encrypted and
plain I will remove them and announce failed test...
if (sent_message_plain.contains(nonce) &&
Sent_nonces.contains(nonce))
{
System.out.println("Sender is sending the same nonce "
+ nonce + " out both encrypted and plain.");
System.out.println("It may only be used to complete an
incoming test.");
//remove the bad nonce from both respective vectors...
// int z = sent_message_plain.indexOf(nonce);
//
sent_message_plain.removeElementAt(z + 1);
//
sent_message_plain.removeElement(nonce);
int z = Sent_nonces.indexOf(nonce);
Sent_nonces.removeElementAt(z + 1);
Sent_nonces.removeElement(nonce);
//now we put this comp in the bad test comp vector so we
don't flag an unsolicited test
// bad_test_comp.addElement(comp);
nonces_I_saw.addElement(nonce);
}
}//End of person being the sender////////////////////
if (person.equals("receiver"))//////Start the receiver
{
if (nonces_I_saw.contains(nonce) && is_fresh)
{ System.out.println("Warning: " + this.lname + " is
seeing " + nonce + " again...but it's tagged with * (fresh)
identifier!");
}
if (sent_plain && is_fresh)
nonces_I_saw.addElement(nonce);
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// &&
!bad_test_comp.contains(comp) this was part of restrictions on
unsolicited test...
if (!this.people_I_sent_stuff_to.contains(from)
&& !Sent_nonces.contains(nonce) &&
!messages_I_saw.contains(comp)
&& readable && (is_fresh | lwasfresh) &&
!nonces_I_saw.contains(nonce)
&& !sent_message_plain.contains(nonce) &&
!old_sent.contains(nonce) && !type_enc.equalsIgnoreCase("ASYM"))
{
System.out.print("Unsolicited test for " + this.lname);
System.out.println(" because of nonce " + nonce + "
within test component < " + comp + " > ");
nonces_I_saw.addElement(nonce);
}//End of If for unsolicited test
else if (!this.people_I_sent_stuff_to.contains(from) &&
!bad_test_comp.contains(comp)
&& !messages_I_saw.contains(comp) && readable &&
is_fresh && (nonces_I_saw.contains(nonce)
| sent_message_plain.contains(nonce) |
Sent_nonces.contains(nonce)))
{ System.out.println("Sender may be attempting to
initiate a test with an old nonce!"); }
else if (!this.people_I_sent_stuff_to.contains(from) &&
bad_test_comp.contains(comp) &&
!messages_I_saw.contains(comp) && readable &&
is_fresh)
{
System.out.print("Receiver is receiving an invalid
test component " + comp);
System.out.println(" otherwise, it would be an
unsolicited test with fresh term " + nonce);
}
if (this.people_I_sent_stuff_to.contains(from) &&
readable && is_fresh
&& !nonces_I_saw.contains(nonce) &&
!Sent_nonces.contains(nonce)
&& !sent_message_plain.contains(nonce) &&
!old_sent.contains(nonce) && !type_enc.equalsIgnoreCase("ASYM"))
{
System.out.println("Pseudo-unsolicited test for "+
this.lname + " because " + nonce
+ " is a newly received fresh nonce, but " +
this.lname + " has sent items to " + from + " previously.");
nonces_I_saw.addElement(nonce);
}
else if (this.people_I_sent_stuff_to.contains(from) &&
readable && is_fresh
&& !nonces_I_saw.contains(nonce) &&
Sent_nonces.contains(nonce))
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{ System.out.println("Sender may be attempting to
intitiate a test with an old nonce!"); }

if (comp_I_sent.contains(comp) && !sent_plain)
{
System.out.println("Evaluation of term " + nonce +
" indicates it is part of a component " + comp);
System.out.println("which is being retransmitted.
Therefore, test component " + comp + " is invalidated!");
}
if (!comp_I_sent.contains(comp) &&
!old_nonces.contains(nonce))
{//If it is fresh and not a duplicate test comp and not
a proper subterm somewhere
if (Sent_nonces.contains(nonce) && sent_plain)
{
int t = Sent_nonces.indexOf(nonce);
t = t + 1;
System.out.println("The encrypted/fresh nonce " +
nonce + " has been received back in new component: " + comp);
System.out.print("Outgoing test for " + this.lname +
" because fresh term " + nonce + " was sent out earlier");
System.out.println(" in < " +
Sent_nonces.elementAt(t)+ " > ");
old_nonces.addElement(nonce);//Now I've got it back
I add nonce to old nonces vector
old_nonces.addElement(Sent_nonces.elementAt(t));//add associated
message
}
if (sent_message_plain.contains(nonce) && !sent_plain
&&
!(bad_test_comp.contains(comp) &&
temp_holdings.contains(comp))&& !type_enc.equalsIgnoreCase("ASYM"))
{
int t = sent_message_plain.indexOf(nonce);
t = t + 1;
System.out.println("The unencrypted/fresh
nonce " + nonce + " has been received back in new component: " + comp);
System.out.print("Incoming test for " + this.lname +
" because fresh term " + nonce + " was sent out earlier");
System.out.println(" in < " +
sent_message_plain.elementAt(t) + " >");
old_nonces.addElement(nonce);
old_nonces.addElement(sent_message_plain.elementAt(t));
}//End of else for incoming
if (Sent_nonces.contains(nonce) && !sent_plain &&
!temp_holdings.contains(temp_comp)&& type_enc.equalsIgnoreCase("ASYM"))
{
int t = Sent_nonces.indexOf(nonce);
t = t + 1;
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System.out.println("The encrypted/fresh nonce " +
nonce + " has been received back in new component: " + comp);
System.out.print("Outgoing test for " + this.lname +
" because fresh term " + nonce + " was sent out earlier");
System.out.println(" in < " +
Sent_nonces.elementAt(t)+ " > ");
old_nonces.addElement(nonce);//Now I've got it back
I add nonce to old nonces vector
old_nonces.addElement(Sent_nonces.elementAt(t));//add associated
message
}//End of else if for outgoing test
else if (Sent_nonces.contains(nonce) && !sent_plain
&& !temp_holdings.contains(temp_comp))
{
int t = Sent_nonces.indexOf(nonce);
t = t + 1;
System.out.println("The encrypted/fresh nonce " +
nonce + " has been received back in new component: " + comp);
System.out.print("Outgoing/Incoming test for " +
this.lname + " because fresh term " + nonce + " was sent out earlier");
System.out.println(" in < " +
Sent_nonces.elementAt(t)+ " > ");
old_nonces.addElement(nonce);//Now I've got it back
I add nonce to old nonces vector
old_nonces.addElement(Sent_nonces.elementAt(t));//add associated
message
}//End of else if for outgoing/incoming test
if (temp_holdings.contains(temp_comp) &&
Sent_nonces.contains(nonce))
{
System.out.println("The encrypted nonce "+ nonce +
" has been received back, but in a duplicated transmission!");
System.out.println("The component " + comp + " was
sent out identically by this sender.");
}//End of retransmitted test
}
}//End of receiver part of addnonce function
} //End of addnonce
}//End of class Principal
package protocolB;
/**
* Stephen Mancini and Robert Graham
* AFIT/ENG
* 23 Feb 2004
The purpose of this class is as follows:
Whenever an instance of an encrypted term is called, it happens here.
This class will ascertain if
a particular message is readable by sender, receiver, both or neither.
This happens through recursive calls
of getreadabletext() which is abstract and located several classes.
The arguments are the same, however, based
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on who can read it, the from and to strings are set to relevant
setting. For instance, if a sender can read it
the from string is set to that value.
Bottom line, based on key values, sender and receiver are set and
getreadabletext function is called...
*/
import java.util.*;
public class Encryption extends Term
{
/** Creates a new instance of Encryption */
public Encryption(Term t, Text k) {
this.term = t;
this.key = k;
}
public Term getTerm() {
return term;
}
public Text getKey() {
return key;
}

public void getComp(Vector bad_test_comp, Vector temp_holdings,
String lfrom, String lto, boolean outside)
{//I only want to add those cases where t = {h}k so add encrypted
wihtin encrypted components!
if (outside)
{
//This part is for whenever I might be bringing encryption from
the min part but lets say it is in a sequence
//I still need to store that outside part and unfortunately
this can't be done in PA because it call getComp
//of whatever object type it finds. So if outside is only
encryption I can handle it in PA otherwise I go inside
//each object type's getComp and do whatever, in some cases
this misght perform different functions
//so you may see repeating code ut chances are it is augmenting
something unique to that inside instance
temp_holdings.addElement(this);
int max = this.toString().length();
int Y = 0;
String hold = "";
while (Y < max)
{
if (!this.toString().substring(Y, Y+1).equalsIgnoreCase("*"))
hold = hold + this.toString().substring(Y, Y+1);
Y++;
}//End of while loop through string
temp_holdings.addElement(hold);
String hold1 = hold + lfrom;
String hold2 = hold + lto;
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if (!temp_holdings.contains(hold1))
if (!temp_holdings.contains(hold2))
temp_holdings.addElement(hold1);
}//End of adding component based on the fact that it is outside
but iin sequential order
if (this.getTerm() instanceof Sequence)
{
Sequence S = (Sequence) this.getTerm();
for (ListIterator k = S.getTerms(); k.hasNext();)
{
Term l = (Term) k.next();
if (l instanceof Encryption)
{//Not seeing the other term as encryption...
if (temp_holdings.contains(l.toString()))
bad_test_comp.addElement(l);//encryption within
encryption...ruled out as test component
///////////////Just removing any astrerisks
int max = l.toString().length();
int Y = 0;
String hold = "";
while (Y < max)
{
if (!l.toString().substring(Y,
Y+1).equalsIgnoreCase("*"))
hold = hold + l.toString().substring(Y, Y+1);
Y++;
}
bad_test_comp.addElement(hold);
/////////////End of removing any asterisks
l.getComp(bad_test_comp,temp_holdings, lfrom, lto,
false);//Make sure their isn't more encryption within
}
else
{//not encr5yption? Then either more sequence or text! Love
abstract classes.
l.getComp(bad_test_comp, temp_holdings,lfrom, lto, false);
}
}//End of for loop through sequence iterator
}//End of if it's a sequence..if not sequence or encryption don't
worry about it, it must be text only.
else if (this.getTerm() instanceof Encryption)//encryption within
encryption
{//Any encrypted components wihthin encrypted components are
ruled out as test components
if (temp_holdings.contains(this.getTerm().toString()))
bad_test_comp.addElement(this.getTerm());
}
}//end of getComp() function
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public void getTextObj(Vector text_obj)
{//Let us get all the text objects that are within encryped terms
if (this.getTerm() instanceof Sequence)
{
Sequence s = (Sequence) this.getTerm();
for (ListIterator i = s.getTerms(); i.hasNext(); )
{
Term u = (Term) i.next();
u.getTextObj(text_obj);
}
}//end of sequence
else if (this.getTerm() instanceof Text)
this.getTerm().getTextObj(text_obj);
else
this.getTerm().getTextObj(text_obj);
}//End of getTextObj()

public void getReadableTexts(String lfrom, String lto, Vector p,
boolean readable,
boolean sent_plain, String comp,
Vector list_of_components,
Vector old_sent, Vector bad_test_comp,
Vector temp_holdings, Vector text_obj, String type_enc)
{
String temp = "";//If I can't open it I need to send a blank
recipient
String temp_from = "";//I will set this based on whether or not
component is new regardless of encryption
//Making assumotion that if comp is new that is where it
originates.
String temp1 = this.key.toString().substring(1,2);//Set the first
value for the key
String temp2 = "";//Maybe there are 2 values for the key...
type_enc = "ASYM"; //What type of encryption? Needed for
negating unsolicited tests
if (comp.equalsIgnoreCase(""))
comp = this.term.toString();//If it wasn't a sequence in
P..A... then just use this term
if (this.key.toString().length()>2)
{
temp2 = this.key.toString().substring(2,3);
type_enc = "SYM";
}
if (!list_of_components.contains(comp))
{
temp_from = lfrom;
list_of_components.addElement(comp);//It's not getting added in
PA so this is a quick fix...
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//besides, most concern in protocols comes inside the encrypted
portions transmission.
}
if ((temp1.equalsIgnoreCase(lto) | temp2.equalsIgnoreCase(lto))
&& (temp1.equalsIgnoreCase(lfrom) | temp2.equalsIgnoreCase(lfrom)))
{//sender and recipient can read it
System.out.println("Encrypt term(s) < " + this.term + " > with
key " + this.getKey().toString() + " is readable by both
sender/receiver." );
term.getReadableTexts(lfrom, lto, p, true, false, comp,
list_of_components, old_sent, bad_test_comp, temp_holdings, text_obj,
type_enc);// this.term.toString());
}
else if (temp1.equalsIgnoreCase(lto) |
temp2.equalsIgnoreCase(lto))
{//Only the recipient can read it
System.out.println("Encrypted term(s) < " + this.term + " > with
key " + this.getKey().toString() +" is readable by recipient only." );
term.getReadableTexts(temp_from, lto, p, true, false,comp,
list_of_components, old_sent, bad_test_comp, temp_holdings, text_obj,
type_enc);// this.term.toString());
}
else if (temp1.equalsIgnoreCase(lfrom) |
temp2.equalsIgnoreCase(lfrom))
{//Only the sender can read it
System.out.println("Encrypted term(s) < " + this.term + " > with
key " + this.getKey().toString() + " is readable by sender only.");
term.getReadableTexts(lfrom, temp, p, false, false,comp,
list_of_components, old_sent, bad_test_comp, temp_holdings, text_obj,
type_enc);// this.term.toString());
}
else
{//Neither can read it
System.out.println("Encrypted term(s) < " + this.term + " >
with key " + this.getKey().toString() + " is readable by neither sender
nor receiver.");
term.getReadableTexts(temp_from, temp, p, true, false, comp,
list_of_components, old_sent, bad_test_comp, temp_holdings, text_obj,
type_enc);//If the key doen't match either party
}
}
public String toString() {
return "{" + term.toString() + "}" + key.toString();
}
protected Term term;
protected Text key;
protected boolean within = false;
}
package protocolB;
/**
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*
* A Protocol is a sequence of {@link Message}s.
* Created on December 8, 2003, 4:57 PM
* @author rgraham
*/
import java.util.*;
public class Protocol
{
/** Creates a new instance of a Protocol. */
public Protocol() {
messages = new ArrayList();
}
public void addMessage(Message m) {
messages.add(m);
}
public ListIterator listIterator() {
return messages.listIterator();
}
public String toString() {
StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer();
for (ListIterator i = messages.listIterator(); i.hasNext(); )
sb.append(((Message) i.next()).toString() + "\n");
return sb.toString();
}
protected List messages;
private static class Class1 {
}
}
package protocolB;
/**
* A message is a term that one principal sends to another.
*
* @author rgraham
*/
public class Message {
/** Creates a new instance of Message */
public Message(String from, String to, Term term) {
this.from = from;
this.to = to;
this.term = term;
}
public String getReceiver() {
return to;
}
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public String getSender() {
return from;
}
public Term getTerm() {
return term;
}
public void setReceiver(String to) {
this.to = to;
}
public void setSender(String from) {
this.from = from;
}
public void setTerm(Term term) {
this.term = term;
}
public String toString() {
return from + " -> " + to + " : " + term;
}
protected String from;
protected Term
term;
protected String to;
}
/*
* TermParser.java
*
* Created on December 8, 2003
*/
package protocolB;
import protocolB.Parser.*;
import java.io.*;
import java.text.ParseException;
/**
* A TermParser tests the parser's ability to parse Terms. The term to
parse is
* specified on the command line (if it contains space, put it in
quotes).
*
* @author rgraham
*/
public class TermParser
{
public static void main(String[] args) {
boolean err = false;
Term term = null;
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if (args.length == 0) {
System.out.println("Nothing to parse.");
System.exit(1);
}
System.out.println("Parsing term: '" + args[0] + "'");
Parser p = new Parser(new StringReader(args[0]));
try {
term = p.parseTerm();
} catch (ParseException e) {
System.out.println(e + " at offset " + e.getErrorOffset());
err = true;
} catch (Exception e) {
System.out.println(e);
err = true;
}
if (!err)
System.out.println("Successful parse of '" + term + "'");
}
}
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